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The Software Licensing Dilemma
Nancy S. Kim
Is software licensed or sold? Software licensing occupies a unique
position at the intersection of contracts, intellectual property, and
commercial law doctrines. The difficulty in analyzing software
licensing issues directly results from the sui generis nature of software
that leads to the construct of what I refer to as the “software
licensing dilemma”—if software is sold and not licensed, the
licensor’s ability to control unauthorized uses of its product is
significantly curtailed; on the other hand, if software is licensed and
not sold, the licensee’s rights under the agreement are unduly
restricted.
Currently, the use of contract law to evaluate software license
agreements is problematic not because the doctrine is inadequate but
because those who use the rhetoric of contracts have tended to
impose an artificially static view of what contract law demands—a
view that wholly ignores the philosophical objectives underlying
contract law. In this Article, I propose adopting a “dynamic
contracts” approach to resolving the software licensing dilemma. A
dynamic contracts approach aims to effectuate the intent of the
parties while balancing their intent against policy considerations. A
determination of the parties’ intent would include examining both
the nature of the transaction and the terms of the written document
or license agreement. This Article argues that the validity of a license
grant should not be inextricably tied to the validity of the contract.
Contrary to what is suggested by the first sentence of this Article—is
software licensed or sold?—software transactions are not a binary
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proposition. While some transactions can clearly be identified as
either licensing or sales deals, most entail both. The recognition of
the independence of license grant provisions exposes the binary
proposition of license versus sale as a false dichotomy. In applying a
dynamic contracts approach, this Article also addresses several policy
considerations relevant to interpreting two often disputed license
provisions—the restriction on transferability and the restriction on
commercial use.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1105
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE LICENSE VERSUS
SALE DEBATE ................................................................. 1110
A. The Applicable Regulatory Regime and Default
Rules ........................................................................ 1110
III. A SUMMARY OF THE PRIMARY APPROACHES TO THE
LICENSING DILEMMA ..................................................... 1113
A. Policy-Based Approaches to the License/Sale Issue .. 1113
B. Contract-Based Approach to the Licensing of
Software ................................................................... 1123
C. A Dynamic Contracts Approach to Software
Transactions ............................................................. 1129
IV. APPLYING A DYNAMIC APPROACH: TWO EXAMPLES............ 1144
A. Example 1: Restrictions on Transferability ................ 1144
B. Example 2: “Non-Commercial Use Only” or
“Personal Use Only” ................................................ 1146
V. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS . 1153
A. Software Manipulability Necessitates Greater Control
(i.e., The First “Software is Different” Argument) .... 1154
B. Software Is Inherently Faulty, Which Necessitates
Substantial Control over Distribution (i.e., The
Second “Software Is Different” Argument) .............. 1157
C. Software Producers Should Be Able to Distribute
Their Products as They See Fit (i.e., The Libertarian
View of Property) ..................................................... 1159
1104

KIM.PP3

1103]

10/20/2008 1:30 PM

The Software Licensing Dilemma
D. Software Producers Need to Control Subsequent
Sales in Order to Sell More Copies of Software......... 1160

VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 1162
I. INTRODUCTION
On several occasions, Tim Vernor listed Autodesk software
products for sale on eBay, the Internet auction site.1 Each time,
Autodesk sent a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)
notice to eBay, claiming that a sale of the Autodesk product would
infringe its copyright. In response, eBay suspended the auction and
Vernor, in turn, filed a DMCA counter-notice to Autodesk claiming
that the sale was lawful.2 Vernor, wishing to sell additional Autodesk
software, eventually sought a declaration that his resale of Autodesk
software was lawful.3
Vernor had obtained copies of the Autodesk software products
from a third party, “CTA.”4 Autodesk, in turn, had transferred the
software products to CTA pursuant to a settlement agreement that
required CTA to adhere to the terms of Autodesk’s end-user license
agreement. Autodesk claimed that its end-user license agreement
stated that the product could not be resold or transferred.5
The court in Vernor faced an important question regarding
software transactions—is software licensed or sold? The court
acknowledged that the cases addressing the license versus sale issue,
even within the Ninth Circuit, were in “unavoidable” and
“irreconcilable conflict.”6 The federal district court ultimately
concluded that the transaction between Autodesk and CTA was a
“sale with restrictions on use,” which fell under the first sale

1. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1165–66 (W.D. Wash. 2008); see
also Complaint C07-1189 (on file with the author); Jacqui Cheng, Autodesk Sued for $10
Million After Invoking DMCA to Stop eBay Resales, Sept. 13, 2007,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070913-autodesk-sued-for-10-million-afterinvoking-dmca-to-stop-ebay-resales.html.
2. Vernor, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1165–66.
3. Id. In addition, Vernor sought damages based upon a claim of unfair competition.
4. Id. at 1166–67.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1172–73.
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doctrine.7 The court based its ruling upon the earliest Ninth Circuit
case addressing the issue of license versus sale, even though that case
did not involve software products.8 Unfortunately, the court’s
decision is inconsistent with the leading Ninth Circuit cases that
specifically address the license versus sale issue as it pertains to
software.9 In fact, the court noted that if it were to apply recent case
precedent to the matter at hand, “it would conclude that Autodesk
did not sell AutoCAD copies to CTA.”10
Scholarship addressing the license versus sale issue in the context
of software can be broadly categorized in two ways. One type of
analysis focuses on the policy implications of software product
licensing.11 This approach seeks to answer the normative question of
whether software products should be licensed (rather than sold) and,
consequently, delves into the nature of software and how best to
characterize it.12 The second type of software licensing analysis
examines the form of the transaction.13 This approach generally
contemplates only non-negotiated licenses14 and is primarily
concerned with the answer to a doctrinal contracts question: was the
purported license agreed to by the parties?
These two approaches stem from the sui generis nature of
software licensing. Software licensing stands at the crossroads of
contracts and intellectual property doctrine and consumer and digital

7. Id. at 1170–71 (quoting United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir.
1997)).
8. Id. The case that the court cited was Wise, 550 F.2d 1180. In Wise, the Ninth
Circuit found that the transfer of a movie print was a sale with restrictions on use. Id. at 1192–
94.
9. The trio of Ninth Circuit cases cited by the court in Autodesk and referred to as the
“MAI trio” were Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 447 F.3d 769,
784–85 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 117 of the Copyright Act does not apply where a
software developer retains ownership of every copy of software and merely licenses the use of
those copies), Triad Systems Corp. v. S.E. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a
license and not a sale where the contract banned duplication of software by customers and
prohibited software use by third parties), and MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a software license agreement valid and the software
product not sold).
10. Vernor, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (“[If] restrictions like those in the MAI trio are
sufficient to warrant a ‘no sale’ finding, then the transfer of AutoCAD copies from Autodesk to
CTA was not a sale.”).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B.
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information policy. The licensing of software is different from the
licensing of intellectual property rights alone because it encompasses
not only the underlying technology but the program or “product.”15
Furthermore, as explained in Part IV, the characteristics of software
make it different from other types of consumer products that are sold
outright rather than licensed.
The answer to the license versus sale issue has significant
ramifications. Classifying a transaction as a license or a sale
determines which regulatory regime governs, which default rules
apply, and what rights and remedies are available to each party. In
addition, the characterization of the transaction affects third parties
such as resellers, distributors, and subsequent transferees. Finally, the
resolution of the licensing dilemma will affect other products and
industries. There is already an increase in the number and types of
“licensing” transactions that were formerly classified as “sales.”16
In this Article, I suggest reframing the issue of software licensing
as contractual, requiring a dynamic approach that takes into account
both public and private interests. The mechanism by which software
is licensed is a contract; accordingly, the enforceability of that
contract should depend on an analysis under contract law.17
Currently, using contract law to evaluate software licenses is
problematic, not because the doctrine is not up to the challenge, but
because courts and commentators who employ the rhetoric of
contracts tend to impose an artificially static view of what contract
law demands. In reaction to such a narrow construction of contract
doctrine, the temptation on the part of many scholars and
commentators has been either to jettison contract law altogether in
favor of policy arguments18 or, alternatively, to mask such a policy

15. See David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright
Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 166–72 (1990) (discussing how the
inapposite nature of software licensing differs from other established forms of copyright-related
licensing).
16. See infra Part V.
17. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (treating
“licenses as ordinary contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as governed
by the common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code,” but leaving open the
issue of “[w]hether there are legal differences between ‘contracts’ and ‘licenses’ (which may
matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale)” (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994))).
18. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1453
(2004). Robinson argues that “whether one should be able to contract around limitations on

1107

KIM.PP3

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/20/2008 1:30 PM

[2008

agenda under the guise of adhering to contract law while violating
existing contract doctrine. While policy arguments are important and
relevant, trying to unearth a distinct “law of software licensing” is
like trying to capture shadows—the shadows will shift with time.
Because the nature (and uses) of software and digital information are
constantly evolving, attempts to contain software and digital
information in doctrinal boxes are unsuccessful.19
Furthermore, there is a fundamental flaw in the standard analysis
of software licenses—software licensing, contrary to recent court
cases, is not a binary proposition. While some transactions can clearly
be identified as either licensing or sales deals, most entail both.20 The
delineation of license and sale portions of a transaction, as well as
violations of scope of license and other contractual terms, is
imperative in addressing the rights and obligations of each party.
This Article makes two arguments. First, the dilemma posed by
software transactions—sales or licenses?—should be answered by
dynamic contract law. Dynamic contract law has as its objective
effectuating the intent of the parties but weighs that objective against
policy considerations. Second, the validity of a license grant should
not be inextricably tied to the validity of the contract as a whole. The
problem with relying on contract doctrine in the context of software

copyrighted or patented property should depend not on some formalistic distinction between
contract rights and property rights, but on the policies at stake.” Id. at 1453.
19. Frank H. Easterbrook made this observation when he famously compared cyberlaw
to “the law of the horse” and noted that “[b]eliefs lawyers hold about computers, and
predictions they make about new technologies, are highly likely to be false. This should make
us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The blind are not good trailblazers.”
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207.
But see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. Rev.
501, 502 (1999) (arguing that “there is an important general point that comes from thinking
in particular about how law and cyberspace connect”); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis,
Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (explaining why there is a need for a sui generis
approach to legal protection of computer programs).
20. Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (stating the “common judicial dichotomization”
of a “license” and a “sale” of software is labeled as misleading because the “gravamen of a
software transfer is the license itself and therefore such a transfer can involve either a sale or a
lease of a software copy, but it must always involve a license in some form. Alternatively, a sale
or a lease of a software copy can be accompanied by a sale or a lease of a copyright itself, but
under most circumstances, the term ‘license’ indicates only if and to what extent the copyright
owners wishes to dispose of some or all of its exclusive rights to a computer program.”).
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licensing is that, too often, the application of that doctrine is static
and formalistic. A new doctrine is not necessary to address software
licensing issues; rather, the old doctrine needs to be reinvigorated to
address changes in the marketplace. A license grant is not solely and
exclusively a contractual term, the validity of which depends on the
validity of the contract in its entirety; rather, in the event that a
software license fails as a contract, the license grant may be
considered—separate from the contract as a whole—as a promise
made by the licensor that is contingent on the licensee’s performance
and adherence to its terms.
Part II discusses the implications of the licensing dilemma and
the ramifications that flow from a determination of the transaction as
either a license or a sale. Part III summarizes existing approaches to
the software licensing dilemma and proposes a “dynamic contracts”
approach to examining software transactions. A dynamic contracts
approach identifies the nature of the transaction as relevant to
determining the intent of the parties. Part III also proposes several
criteria for distinguishing a “sales” transaction from a “licensing”
transaction and acknowledges that most software transactions
contain aspects of both.21 In addition, Part III discusses the effect of
written terms that accompany a product in both a licensing and a
sales transaction. Because software license agreements are contracts,
their validity and enforceability should depend first and foremost on
their validity and enforceability as contracts; however, rather than
examining the written agreement in order to characterize the
transaction, we should look to the transaction to determine how to
interpret the written terms. In a sales transaction, the license grant is
effective as a promise independent from the other terms contained in
the “contract.” Recognizing the independence of license grant
provisions exposes the binary proposition of license versus sale as a
false dichotomy.
Part IV examines two common license restrictions and discusses
how each should be interpreted using a dynamic contracts approach.
Part V discusses and responds to anticipated objections to this
approach. This Article concludes that the software licensing dilemma
is a red herring. Technology has created challenges for software
producers, but those challenges are not unique to the software
industry. Before we distort existing legal doctrine in an effort to

21. Id. at 12–15, 19–22.
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accommodate the perceived needs of a specific market segment, we
should carefully consider the impact of doing so on other market
segments. It would be much wiser to take the long view to address
technological changes than to create exceptions that morph into
rules with regrettable implications.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE LICENSE VERSUS SALE
DEBATE
The ramifications of characterizing software transactions as either
licenses or sales are manifold. As previously mentioned, the license or
sale determination has a domino effect on the applicable regulatory
regime, default rules, and available remedies. Furthermore, how the
license versus sale issue plays out in the context of software
transactions affects not only the software industry but many other
commercial markets.
A. The Applicable Regulatory Regime and Default Rules
While software is protected by copyright law, licenses of the
software are contracts and thus governed by contract law. If software
products are “sold” and if they are “goods,”22 the transaction is
governed by commercial law.23 The analysis of software transactions

22. The pre-2003 Article 2-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines “goods” as
“all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other
than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities . . . and things in
action.” U.C.C. § 2-105 (2002). The 2003 amendments added “information” to the list of
things that are not considered goods, but left unresolved whether software products are
“goods” or “information.” See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(k) (2007). Comment 7 to the amended §
2-103(k) states that “an electronic transfer of information” is not a good but expressly
acknowledges that “transactions often include both goods and information: some are
transactions in goods . . . and some are not.” Id. at cmt. 7. The lack of clarity appears to be
intentional:
When a transaction includes both the sale of goods and the transfer of rights in
information, it is up to the courts to determine whether the transaction is entirely
within or outside of this article; or whether or to what extent this article should be
applied to a portion of the transaction. While this article may apply to a transaction
including information, nothing in this article alters, creates, or diminishes
intellectual property rights.
Id.
23. See infra Part II.A.2. Efforts to create a uniform commercial code governing
contracts for computer information have been unsuccessful. The Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), a joint effort of the American Bar Association and the
American Law Institute, was ultimately rejected by both organizations amidst opposition that
the Act was biased against consumers. See Daniel A. DeMarco & Christopher B. Wick, Now
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thus requires an awareness of the domino-like effect of characterizing
the transaction as either a license or a sale.
1. The first sale doctrine and its consequences
If a software transaction is characterized as a “sale,” then the first
sale doctrine governs that transaction. Under Section 106 of the
1976 Copyright Act,24 the owner of a copyright has the following
exclusive rights: the right to reproduce her work;25 the right to
prepare derivative works based upon her creation;26 and the right to
distribute copies of her work.27 The first sale doctrine,28 however,
imposes a significant limitation on the exclusive right to distribute.
Under the first sale doctrine, the owner of a particular copy of a
work is entitled, without the permission of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of that copy.29 In other words, the
purchaser of a copy of a work protected by copyright cannot
reproduce or prepare derivative works of that copyrighted work,30
but the purchaser may resell or transfer that copy.31
The effects of the first sale doctrine extend beyond the express
right to transfer a copy of the software. Under the computer “fair
use” provision,32 an owner of a copy of a computer program may
make or authorize the creation of another copy or adaptation of the
program as an “essential step in the utilization of the computer

UCITA, Now You Don’t: A Bankruptcy Practitioner’s Observations on the Proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 34.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
25. Id. § 106(1).
26. Id. § 106(2).
27. Id. § 106(3).
28. Id. § 109(a).
29. Id.
30. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d. 1164, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2008). Of
course, some copying may fall under the fair use exception. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2000).
Under this section, four criteria are to be used in determining whether a defendant’s use
constitutes “fair use”:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
31. See also Determann & Fellmeth, supra note 20, at 22–27 (explaining the first sale
doctrine).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
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program” or for “archival purposes.”33 The right granted under this
provision directly limits the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to
prepare a derivative work.34 Software programs are usually
distributed in machine-readable object code only.35 Adaptation
requires knowledge of the software program, which typically requires
decompilation or reverse engineering of the object code.36 Because
decompilation requires copying the program into the computer
memory and translating and copying the resultant translation, it
would seem to infringe the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under
section 106.37 Nevertheless, such copying is an “essential step” in the
analysis of how the software works.38 It is ownership of a copy of the
copyrighted product that triggers the statutory privilege.39 If
software is sold and not licensed, the purchaser of that copy of the
software product has first sale and fair use rights under copyright
law; if software is licensed instead of sold, the purchaser is merely a
“licensee” and not an owner of the copy of the software product
and, thus, not privileged with first sale and associated rights.
2. Contract law implications of license versus sale
Because written terms accompany a software transaction, an
analysis of that transaction also has contract law implications. A
standard contract law analysis would evaluate the terms of the
“license agreement” according to contract rules of formation and
enforcement. Contract formation is the usual starting point in cases
involving software transactions.40 The characterization of the
transaction as either a license or sale affects how a particular
provision may be interpreted as well as the legal effect of the written
terms, including available remedies for breach.

33. Id. at § 117(1)–(2).
34. Rice, supra note 15, at 163.
35. See Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 197 (1992) (citations omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 198.
38. Id.
39. Rice, supra note 15, at 163. For a discussion of fair use and computer software, see
generally Litman, supra note 35, at 196–204.
40. See infra Part III.B.

1112

KIM.PP3

1103]

10/20/2008 1:30 PM

The Software Licensing Dilemma

III. A SUMMARY OF THE PRIMARY APPROACHES TO THE LICENSING
DILEMMA
Software licensing raises many complex issues related to both the
nature of software and the manner in which it is distributed.
Software does not fit neatly into preexisting legal categories because
it is both tangible and intangible, and both privately owned and
publicly distributable. Although the intellectual property constituting
the underlying software code is legally “owned” by the software
producer, the medium upon which the software is contained can be
readily transferred by others (i.e., non-owners of the software
code).41 Furthermore, unlike tangible property, the code itself is
subject to manipulation and distribution without the owner’s
knowledge or consent. Yet, unlike other types of intangible
property—such as trade secrets or trademarks—software is often
readily available for purchase and can be impersonally bought or sold
to anyone willing to pay the price.
The license versus sale question is both a factual or descriptive
one and a normative one. In other words, the license versus sale
debate usually involves two distinct but closely related issues. The
first is whether software should be licensed or sold. The second is
whether software is in fact licensed or sold. The former requires a
policy analysis; the latter primarily involves issues of contract
formation.
A. Policy-Based Approaches to the License/Sale Issue
In order to address the question of whether software should, or
must, be licensed, a subordinate question must be asked and
answered regarding whether the issues raised by software licensing
are capable of being adequately addressed by existing law. For many,
a useful starting point is the subject matter of the inquiry itself.42 As
explained in this section, the characterization of the software often
determines the characterization of the transaction—which in turn
determines the applicable substantive law. Thus a discussion of the

41. The distribution of movies and music in digital format also raises many of the issues
discussed in this Article.
42. The problems related to defining software have been discussed elsewhere. See
Andrew Chin, Antitrust Analysis in Software Product Markets: A First Principles Approach, 18
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5–6 (2004) (discussing the “fallacious premise” that software products
consist of code).
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struggle to define and characterize software usually accompanies, and
may sometimes overshadow, any doctrinal analysis of contract issues.
The analysis of software licensing often begins with an
assumption of what software is. Generally, there are two ways to
categorize software. The first is what I refer to as the “software as
property” view; the second is referred to as “the software as goods”
view. These two views are typically set in opposition to one another.
Each categorization is more often the result of policy considerations
than the inevitable result of a descriptive analysis based upon the
characteristics of software.
1. Is software property?
One way to categorize software is by focusing on the legal rights
of the licensor. Some commentators adopt the view that since
software code is the (intellectual) property of the licensor, the
licensor may, within legal boundaries, do what it wishes.43 In
accordance with this view, which I will refer to as the “software as
property” view,44 the software industry has long maintained that it
has the right to control the use of software through the use of
contracts, just as other property owners can manage the use of their
property with written agreements.45 Since the software code is the

43. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 108, 113–14 (1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still
Property]. As Hohfeld notes, however, the use of legal terms borrowed from the physical world
is often problematic when applied to metaphysical or non-physical concepts. Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16, 24 (1913) (“Much of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the fact that
many of our words were originally applicable only to physical things; so that their use in
connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional.”).
44. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5 (2004) (noting that IP “has increasingly come to resemble property. The
essentially unlimited duration and scope of the initial IP right today more closely resemble the
unlimited duration and scope of property than the finite regime of protection that the Framers
carved out from a general common law of copying . . . . Many courts and companies today
unquestioningly view property as justifying absolute rights of exclusion and a total lack of
limits on IP holders”).
45. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 953
(2005) (“[W]hat copyright and other IP law does is create property rights in information, after
which normal rules of contract and property law determine who uses that information.”).
Professor Glen Robinson notes that the “now ubiquitous use of restrictive licensing
agreements has created the functional equivalent of personal property servitudes.” Robinson,
supra note 18, at 1452. Robinson adds that “the most important contemporary occasion for
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licensor’s intellectual property, protected by copyright law, the
licensor may distribute all, some, or none of the rights attaching to
the property.46 If the licensor chooses to grant only some of the
rights, the most straightforward approach is to use a contract that
delineates which rights the licensee has and which rights it does not
have.47
Included within a property owner’s “bundle of rights” is the
right to exclude others.48 Typically, unauthorized access to personal
property constitutes trespass to chattels, a common law tort.49 Those
who adopt a property-based conception of software argue that
misuse of software would constitute a “trespass to chattels.”50 Such

considering personal property restrictions arises in the field of intellectual property,” and refers
to intellectual property rights as a “special form of property rights.” Id.
46. See Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent in the Formation of Information Contracts: The
Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 195, 216–18
(1999) (noting that contractual use restrictions should be permitted to serve as substitutes for
practical, physical barriers).
47. See id. But see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1092–
93 (2005) (arguing that contract is not an adequate alternative to a theory of virtual property
ownership).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (referring
to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights as a “bundle of exclusive rights”).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
50. Several courts have applied the trespass to chattels doctrine to Web sites and/or
computer servers. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); eBay Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Other
courts have expressly declined to do so. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal.
2003). For a discussion of the “trespass to chattels” doctrine applied to digital information, see
Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000); Kevin
Emerson Collins, Cybertrespass and Trespass to Documents, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 41 (2006);
Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in Information and Information
Systems, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 235, 240–44 (2003) [hereinafter Lipton, Mixed Metaphors];
Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 464–
71 (2003). For a more general discussion of the property/intellectual property debate, see also
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, supra note 43 (stating that intellectual
property should be treated as property); I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible,
Intangible, Digital and Analog Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 211, 213 (2001) (arguing that for the “purposes of intellectual property
rules and regimes, there are no differences between intangible and tangible property; nor are
there any differences between digital and non-digital materials”). But cf. Michael J. Madison,
Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 302–08 (2003) (stating the
need for caution in treating software as “chattel”).
For alternatives to a “chattel theory” of property, see Burk, supra, at 27 (discussing the
emergence of a new form of intellectual property with “only the most tenuous of antecedents
in the law of chattels”); Fairfield, supra note 47 (introducing a theory of virtual property).
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misuse would include using software beyond the scope of license
granted.
Several policy considerations underlie and explain the “software
as property” viewpoint.51 One is a libertarian view of property and
ownership.52 Another is a policy that puts faith in the markets,53
favors business flexibility, and encourages innovative business
models.54 This view contends that in order to encourage innovation,
a creator must capture the full social benefit of that innovation.55 A
third consideration worries about the reputational effects of a loss of
creative or artistic control.56
Opponents of the “software as property” view challenge the
notion that intellectual property is “just like” property.57 It follows
that if intellectual property is not the same as real or personal

51. For a discussion of the information costs associated with both property and
intellectual property, see Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007).
52. See Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, supra note 43.
53. See generally Robinson, supra note 18.
54. But see Dan Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 121
(1999) (arguing that efficiency justifications for clear property rights ignore the efficiency of
unclear or “muddy” property rules).
55. Hardy, supra note 50; F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 717–27 (2000). The economist Harold
Demsetz is most often associated with the idea that property rights, and the right to exclude,
are a way for an actor to fully capture the social benefit it provides or the “internalization” of
“externalities,” as it is often referred to among economist. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347–49 (1967); see also Harold Demsetz, The
Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. L. & ECON. 293 (1970). But see Brett Frischmann &
Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 274 (2007) (arguing that complete
capture of social benefits or externalities is not necessary to optimize investment incentives).
For discussion of the economic rationales underlying the treatment of intellectual property as
property, see Smith, supra note 51. Smith explains that exclusion rights in information outputs
may act as a way to establish property rights in rival inputs to invention and commercialization.
Id. at 1746. See also Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217 (1996) (discussing economic theories that support a regime of private property
in cyberspace).
56. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United
States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9 (2001) (discussing artistic integrity concerns and
how they may be affected by the DMCA).
57. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (2004) (suggesting that the treatment of intellectual property “just like” real
property is “a mistake as a practical matter”). But see Lipton, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 50,
at 240–41 (arguing that incorporating notions of property into information and information
systems is unavoidable and not as important as how we use such metaphors).
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property,58 then software code—which is protected by intellectual
property law—is also not the same as property.59 Even accepting the
distinction between property and intellectual property does not
necessarily invalidate licenses since the licensor and the licensee may
nevertheless grant and relinquish rights as they freely choose under
contract law.60 An issue arises, however, where one of the rights that
the licensee relinquishes under the contract is one that the licensee
would otherwise have under the Copyright Act. While giving up an
existing right under a contract may be the very essence of a
bargained-for exchange, the idea of a contract regulating the same
rights referred to under a federal law raises the specter of federal
preemption.61 While some scholars have argued that software licenses
that seek to regulate the rights addressed under the Copyright Act

58. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 790 (2007) (“Property rules designed with land in
mind often do not translate well to the more fluid environment of the Internet, where they
have the potential to impose significant transaction costs and prevent the efficient functioning
of the Internet.”).
59. Mark Lemley and Brett Frischmann, for example, argue that unlike real property,
intellectual property or “IP” is much less clearly delineated, and therefore it is more difficult
“to know whether one is ‘trespassing’ upon another’s IP right.” Frischmann & Lemley, supra
note 55, at 274.
60. But cf. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1478 (noting that, as to the “conventional
distinction based on the notion that contract rights are enforceable only between consenting
parties and property rights are enforceable against the world, this distinction is blurred if not
erased completely in the context of computer software where the license can be embedded in
the software itself and is configured to require each new user to agree to its terms before the
program can be run.” Robinson adds that the software license then “becomes virtually
identical to a running servitude and can be regarded, like other servitudes, as a form of
property right”).
61. See generally Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line
Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999) [hereinafter Beyond
Preemption]; Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Shrinkwrap]; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at
the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Contract: Toward a Unified Body of Law, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 1137 (1997).
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are preempted by federal law,62 most courts have disagreed or have
skirted around the issue and left it unresolved.63
2. The “goods” problem
Another view of software emphasizes the way it is distributed
rather than the rights held by the licensor. Under this view, software
that is widely available to the public and is sold “off the shelf,” is a
“good” under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).64
Accordingly, the “software as commercial good” view ignores the
validity of any license agreement accompanying the software and
would look instead to the laws generally governing consumer
product transactions in the event of a dispute.65 The underlying

62. See also Viva R. Moffatt, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of
Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that contract provisions
that limit the fair use doctrine should be preempted by federal law); cf. Robinson, supra note
18, at 1477 (stating that “as a matter of legislative interpretation . . . a categorical exclusion
from the preemptive effect of copyright for all contractual restrictions is unwarranted”).
63. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc. 320 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citing ProCD and holding that “most courts to examine this issue have found that the
Copyright Act does not preempt contractual constraints on copyrighted articles”); ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a contractual restriction on the first
sale doctrine was not preempted by the Copyright Act); Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet
Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1174–75 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (finding that a breach of contract
claim was not preempted because it creates a right not existing under copyright law);
Huckshold v. HSSL, L.L.C., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1208 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (stating that
Section 301 of the Copyright Act does not prevent states from enforcing private transactions);
see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616, 629
(2008) ( “[C]ourts have uniformly held that the [Copyright] Act does not preempt breach of
contract claims.”). Bohannan argues against categorical approaches to preemption of contracts
under the Copyright Act and proposes an intermediate approach based upon waiver doctrine.
Contra Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269–70 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding a
state statute permitting contractual restrictions on decompilation or disassembly to be
preempted by the Copyright Act).
64. See Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A Strategy
That Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 263–64 (2005)
(explaining that software product transactions should be treated as “sales” under Article 2
because doing so works “well enough”). But cf. O’Rourke, supra note 61, at 1142 (arguing
that “federal intellectual property law should support application of the remedial provisions of
the UCC in many situations, and that the use of such remedies is fully consistent with the
policies of both the UCC and intellectual property law” and that “the default rule should be
one which allows an aggrieved licensee to exercise its relevant UCC remedy of resale or cover
without being subject to liability for intellectual property infringement”).
65. Braucher, supra note 64, at 264–67; see also Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925
F.2d 670, 675–76 (3rd Cir. 1991) (computer software a “good” under the UCC); Colonial
Life Ins. Co. v. Elec. Data Sys., Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 239 (D.N.H. 1993) (stating that
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policy consideration is consumer protection (as the terms contained
in Article 2 of the UCC are generally more favorable to consumers
than those contained in software license agreements),66 and an
aversion to corporate antitrust behavior that limits consumer
choices.67
Opponents of this view believe that software is different from
other consumer products, and often use labels for software such as
“information” or “technology” to distinguish its nature from other
consumer products or goods.68 They argue that software is not a
good that is sold, but a right that is—of necessity—licensed.69 The
UCC itself is unclear as to whether software products are included in
the definition of “goods.” Under the preamended UCC, a good is
defined as “all things (including specifically manufactured goods)
that are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which price is to be paid, investment
securities . . . and things in action.”70
Under the amended version of the UCC,71 the definition of
goods includes
all things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract
for sale. The term includes future goods, specially manufactured
goods, the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other
identified things attached to realty . . . . The term does not include
information, the money in which the price is to be paid, investment

computer software was a “good” under Article 2); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney,
Inc., 114 P.3d 747 (Cal. 2006) (applying Article 2 to licensed software).
66. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical
Analysis of Software License Agreements, J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Dec. 2007, at 27,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1186102.
67. Determann & Fellmeth, supra note 20, at 27–35 (discussing the importance of
classifying software as “goods” under the UCC for consumers of mass market software).
68. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, An Essay on Article 2’s Irrelevance to Licensing
Agreements, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 237 (2005) (“Article 2 sales rules are, and should be,
irrelevant to licensing, except for the broad themes of Article 2 that have already been
incorporated into the common law.”); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the
Contemporary Information Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 113 (2002) (characterizing
as a “mistaken belief” that the computer industry deals in goods).
69. Nimmer, for example, an opponent of the “software as consumer goods” view,
states that the computer information industries “do not deal in goods. Their focus is not on
tangible property. They deal in information and transactions in intangibles.” Nimmer,
Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy, supra note 68, at 113.
70. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2003).
71. Article 2 of the UCC was amended in 2003 but most of the provisions have not
been enacted by state legislatures.
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securities . . . , the subject matter of foreign exchange transactions
or choses in actions.72

It is unclear whether the drafters meant to refer to “software”
when they expressly excluded “information” from the definition of
goods.73 The Official Comments dance around the issue by stating
that
[t]his article does not directly apply to an electronic transfer
of information, such as the transaction involved in Specht v.
Netscape. However, transactions often include both goods and
information: some are transactions in goods. . . . and some are
not. . . . When a transaction includes both the sale of goods and
the transfer of rights in information, it is up to the courts to
determine whether the transaction is entirely within or outside of
this article, or whether or to what extent this article should be
applied to a portion of the transaction. While this article may apply
to a transaction including information, nothing in this article alters,
creates, or diminishes intellectual property rights.74

While the media upon which the software program is loaded
could readily be defined as a “good,” the accompanying license to
use the program is not so susceptible to interpretation. On the other
hand, it is inaccurate to say that a license is “information.” While the
code contained in the software product is certainly “information,”
the right to use that information—and the media upon which it is
contained—is not. Thus, the amended version of the UCC leaves the
“license versus sale” issue to be resolved by the courts.
Another view of software—or of the information that comprises
software—is that it is a “public good.”75 The two primary features of

72. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(k) (2003).
73. See Braucher, supra note 64, at 269 (“The uncertainty of what [the exclusion of
information] means, if anything, is one of the key reasons the proposed amendments package
[to Article 2] has not been enacted by any jurisdiction. If information means intangible data,
the exclusion adds nothing. . . . The software customer coalition as well as software producers
have all opposed the proposed exclusion of information because of its failure to clarify the
law.”).
74. U.C.C. § 2-103 cmt. 7 (2003) (citation omitted). The lack of clarity has prompted
at least one scholar to comment, “[s]ince the sponsors [to the amendments] have nothing
clarifying to say, they would be wiser to remain silent.” Braucher, supra note 64, at 263.
75. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1329, 1337–40 (1987).
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public goods are that they are non-excludable and non-rival.76 As
Peter Menell explains:
Given the availability of low-cost copying, it is often impossible to
exclude nonpurchasers from the benefits of innovative computer
programs once they are made commercially available. Moreover,
one person’s use of the information does not detract from any
other person’s use of that same information. Since the authors and
creators of computer software cannot reap the marginal value of
their efforts, in the absence of other incentives to innovate they will
undersupply technological advances in computer software. The
government typically alleviates the public goods problem in
generating innovation and original expression by bestowing limited
legal protection for goods that embody novel ideas and literary
works that contain original expression.77

The flip side of the public goods problem is that software is a
public benefit and access to it should not be unduly restricted.78
Promoting access to software encourages technological innovation
that benefits society in many ways, such as facilitating
communication, increasing productivity, and enhancing creativity.79
According to Menell, the problem with applying intellectual
property protection to software is that innovation and advancement
in computer technology are made at many interrelated levels and at
many different stages.80 Thus, the model adopted for literary and
artistic works fails to adequately capture—and consequently fails to
provide—the optimal amount of incentive for innovation of
software.81
The view that software should be used to benefit the public82 is
exemplified by proponents of the “free software” movement83 who

76. But see Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, supra note 55, at 295
(“There is nothing in the public good concept that disallows the ability to exclude. . . . Ability
to exclude nonpurchasers is compatible with both private and public goods.”).
77. Menell, supra note 75, at 1337.
78. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 50, at 222–32 (critiquing the view that digital materials
are “public goods”).
79. But as Henry Smith notes, while information is a public good and can be consumed
at zero marginal cost, creating information requires resources that are rival and susceptible to
exclusion. Smith, supra note 51, at 1744.
80. Menell, supra note 75, at 1330–31.
81. Id.
82. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L.
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advocate open access to software and consider a proprietary or “feepaid” software system to be antisocial.84 Not surprisingly, the
“software as property” advocates oppose the “software as public
benefit” viewpoint, believing that since software “belongs” to the
licensor, the licensor may or may not license the software at its
discretion. Under the “software as property” view, the licensor
should be permitted to reap the benefits of its investment in
researching and developing the software by using whatever
protective measures it deems necessary, including licenses that curtail
otherwise permissible uses under the Copyright Act.85
Ironically, both the “software as public benefit” and the
“software as property” views rely on license agreements to further
and reinforce their position.86 The general public license (“GPL”)
used by free software advocates contains a license grant provision
that expressly permits reproduction and distribution,87 whereas a

REV. 875, 877 (1999) (“[A]ny model of contract formation not driven by the traditional
norms of mutual assent requires specially formulated doctrinal tools to avoid undermining
long-established public good uses of information for such purposes as education and research,
technical innovation, free speech, and the preservation of free competition.”).
83. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary
Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004).
84. See José J. González de Alaiza Cardona, Open Source, Free Software, and Contractual
Issues, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 167 (2007).
85. As Mark Lemley has noted, however, the use of property rhetoric in intellectual
property cases “is accordingly closely identified not with common law property rules in
general, but with a particular view of property rights as the right to capture or internalize the
full social value of property.” Lemley, supra note 57, at 1037.
86. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, supra note 50, at 285 (observing that
while the open source code model contrasts with the closed source code model, they both
adopt the same legal framework).
87. The general public license version 3.0 states, in part, as follows:
All rights granted under this License are granted for the term of copyright on the
Program, and are irrevocable provided the stated conditions are met. This License
explicitly affirms your unlimited permission to run the unmodified Program. . . .
This License acknowledges your rights of fair use or other equivalent, as provided by
copyright law.
You may make, run and propagate covered works that you do not convey, without
conditions so long as your license otherwise remains in force . . . .
No covered work shall be deemed part of an effective technological measure under
any applicable law fulfilling obligations under article 11 of the WIPO copyright
treaty adopted on 20 December 1996, or similar laws prohibiting or restricting
circumvention of such measures.
When you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to forbid
circumvention of technological measures to the extent such circumvention is
effected by exercising rights under this License with respect to the covered work,
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typical consumer software license restricts or prohibits such
reproduction and distribution.88 Thus, both views employ contracts
to control licensee use of software but differ radically over the
purpose and scope of the license grant.
Policy-based approaches attempt to characterize software and are
thus, ultimately, unsatisfying because what software is depends upon
the context and how it is used.89
The mechanism by which software is ostensibly licensed is a
contract; accordingly, the enforceability of that contract should
depend on an analysis under contract law.90
B. Contract-Based Approach to the Licensing of Software
Software producers purport to license software by means of a
contract.91 Licensing agreements may be either negotiated or non-

and you disclaim any intention to limit operation or modification of the work as a
means of enforcing, against the work’s users, your or third parties’ legal rights to
forbid circumvention of technological measures.
GNU General Public License Version 3, June 29, 2007, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl3.0.txt.
88. In contrast to the general public license, a standard vendor license agreement states
as follows:
Vendor grants to Customer a non-exclusive, non-transferable limited license to use
the Licensed Software solely for Customer’s internal business purposes, subject to
the number of licensed concurrent users. Customer may make one copy of the
Licensed Software in machine-readable form for back-up and archival purposes only
. . . . Customer shall not cause the Licensed Software in any way to be disassembled,
decompiled or reverse engineered, nor shall any attempt to do so be undertaken or
permitted . . . . Customer’s use of the Licensed Software shall be subject to the
following restrictions . . . . Customer shall not upload, post, publish or create
derivative works of the Licensed Software; and copy, translate, port,
modify . . . . the Licensed Software.
MICHAEL OVERLY & JAMES R. KALYVAS, SOFTWARE AGREEMENTS LINE BY LINE 14 (2004).
89. See Samuelson et al., supra note 19, at 2372 (“Over the years both the view of
software as a product and the character of the product have . . . evolved considerably, from
business applications supplied with a mainframe, to applications intended for the end-user and
aimed at a mass market, to the more narrowly aimed vertical markets today.”).
90. But see O’Rourke, supra note 61, at 1142 (noting that the nuances of the economic
rationale underlying federal intellectual property law and the UCC differ substantially in two
contexts: federal intellectual property law responds primarily to market imperfections whereas
the UCC is mostly concerned with minimizing costs and maximizing gains of contracting).
91. The use of licensing by software producers as a way to protect software from
unauthorized uses is attributed to the fact that the copyrightability of software was, for a time,
uncertain. Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241,
243–44 (2004) (noting that “relatively few” software developers took advantage of copyright
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negotiated. Negotiated license agreements fit the classic model of
bargaining under contract law and generally follow proper contract
formation including an offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and
consideration. Negotiated licenses may be held unenforceable,
however, with some other invalidating condition such as fraud,
unconscionability, or duress.92
Transactions involving non-negotiated license agreements, on
the other hand, pose a multitude of problems. Non-negotiated
license agreements can be categorized into four groups: executed
written agreements, shrinkwrap agreements, clickwrap agreements,
and browsewrap agreements. Because of the plethora of scholarship
written on “wrap” agreements,93 the following discussion of the
contract formation issues with respect to each type of non-negotiated
license is not an exhaustive analysis and is intended only to frame the
rest of the Article.
1. Written agreements and clickwraps
A standard form license agreement may require a written
signature from both parties but still be an adhesion contract.94 A
typical scenario involves a large software producer with a monopoly
on the marketplace and a smaller business with a desire to purchase
the software (where the software has become the industry standard).
In such a situation, the large software producer may not find it cost

protection for their programs due to the registration requirements). Although the Copyright
Office began to accept software programs for registration in 1964, the Copyright Act itself did
not expressly address the issue of protection for software or computer programs. See Litman,
supra note 35, at 16. In 1978, the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) proposed amendments to the Copyright Act. Id. Those amendments were
later approved by Congress in the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act and left no
question that software programs are within the subject matter of copyright. Id.; see also Menell,
supra note 75, at 1347.
92. See Nancy S. Kim, Mistake, Changed Circumstances and Intent, 56 KAN. L. REV.
473, 474 (2008) (discussing various contract defenses).
93. See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 836–56
(2007); Lemley, Shrinkwrap, supra note 61; Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV.
459 (2006).
94. Adhesion contracts are standard-form agreements that are offered on a nonnegotiable basis and indicate a lack of bargaining power on the part of the non-drafting party.
See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
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effective to negotiate individual terms of a contract with the small
business, either because the total purchase price of the software is
not sufficient to justify such negotiations or because the software
producer has a monopoly on the marketplace due to a patent or
market dominance. Form agreements, even adhesion contracts (i.e.,
those offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis) have typically been
upheld by the courts under a “blanket assent” theory. The blanket
assent theory is attributed to Karl Llewellyn, who stated:
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the broad type of transaction, and but one
thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms . . . which do
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms.95

Thus, under the blanket assent theory of contracts, a signatory to a
contract is deemed to have assented to the “not unreasonable” or
“not indecent” terms of the contract.96
Clickwraps are electronic agreements that appear during
installation of software products and prior to accessing certain
websites.97 The user manifests assent by clicking on an icon that
expresses such assent, usually a box with the words “I accept” or “I
agree” or some similar phraseology. Because the user is required to
indicate assent, albeit through electronic means, clickwrap
agreements are generally enforceable provided that the user has the
opportunity to review the contractual terms prior to clicking on the
“I accept” icon.98

95. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960).
96. See also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 461 (2002) (defining Llewellyn’s notion of
“blanket assent” as meaning that “although consumers do not read standard terms, so long as
their formal presentation and substance are reasonable, consumers comprehend the existence
of the terms and agree to be bound to them”).
97. See Lemley, supra note 93, at 465–66.
98. See Davidson & Assoc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638–39 (8th Cir. 2005); Forrest v.
Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 2002) (click-wrap); Caspi v. Microsoft
Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). But see Specht v.
Netscape Commc’n, Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce a click-
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Both non-negotiated written agreements and clickwraps lack
indicia of bargaining. The user is offered contractual terms on a
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis and the terms are generally more favorable
to the licensor than to the licensee.99 Provided that the terms are not
unconscionable, however, courts have tended to enforce both types
of agreements.100 Both types of agreements require the licensee to
manifest assent—either by affixing his or her signature, or by clicking
on an electronic icon—and such assent is deemed to be blanket
assent to all the “not unreasonable” terms contained in the
document.101
2. Shrinkwraps and browsewraps
Rolling contracts are terms that attach to a transaction after the
acts constituting the transaction have already been performed.102
Shrinkwrap agreements are a type of rolling contract since the buyer
typically does not have an opportunity to review the terms until after
the software is purchased.103 A shrinkwrap agreement is encased in
plastic wrap and bundled with physical media containing software.104
Although many legal commentators have argued against the
enforceability of these agreements on the grounds of lack of mutual
assent, many courts have held that “assent” occurs when the
consumer, after purchasing and possessing the product, opens the
shrinkwrap, notices the paper agreement contained therein, and
declines to return the product105 (despite the fact that returning

wrap); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that a
click-wrap was an invalid contract of adhesion).
99. But see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-11, 2005) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=799274 (finding little correlation
between greater market power and pro-seller standard terms). On the other hand, in an
empiral study of 647 software end user license agreements, Marotta-Wurgler found that “the
vast majority of the contracts” in her sample were more pro-seller relative to the default rules
of Article 2 of the UCC. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 66, at 27.
100. See supra note 98.
101. LLEWELLYN, supra note 95, at 370.
102. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 743–45 (2002).
103. Id.
104. Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwrap, supra note 61, at 1241.
105. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996); Meridian
Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006);
Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (W.D.
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opened software can be a non-trivial undertaking and that many
retail outlets refuse to accept digital products that have been
opened).106 Browsewraps are commonly found on websites or when
downloading software that links to a website.107 Browsewraps
purport to govern the use of a website or product.108 Cases
discussing browsewrap agreements have generally held them
enforceable if the user had notice of their existence.109
Neither shrinkwraps nor browsewraps require an affirmative
action from the licensee to manifest assent. A licensee is deemed to
have assented to the terms of a shrinkwrap simply by failing to return
the software contained within, even if the licensee was unaware of
the existence of such a “contract” at the time of the sales transaction.
In other words, the licensee’s manifestation of assent is deemed to
occur after the licensee has paid for and taken possession of the
software.110 Therefore, that manifestation of assent is a failure to act
by the licensee.111 The licensee is also not required to manifest assent
to browsewrap terms, either before or after engaging in the conduct
purported to be governed by such terms. Both browsewraps and

Pa. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash.
2000). But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Softman
Prods., LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Klocek v.
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).
106. See, e.g., J.D. Biersdorfer, Return Policies Vary for Opened Software, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/23/technology/circuits/23askk.html.
107. Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 279–80 (2003); Lemley, supra note 93, at
464.
108. Kunz et al., supra note 107, at 279.
109. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH(VBKx),
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (holding that contract formed
by proceeding to interior web pages after knowledge or presumptive knowledge of prominent
notice on home page of website). For a summary of leading cases addressing the enforceability
of online agreements, see Patricia Bayer Cunningham & Erin C. Witkow, Click with Caution:
Liability for Breach of Click-Wrap and Browse-Wrap Agreement, 23 COMPUTER & INTERNET
LAWYER 1 (June 2006); Kim, supra note 93, at 836–56.
110. See cases supra note 105.
111. While foisting contract terms upon consumers in this manner may be procedurally
unfair, one study has found that “rolling” end user license agreements (i.e., agreements where
the terms are presented after the product has been paid for and possession transferred) do not
offer more pro-seller terms than firms that make their end user license agreements available
pre-purchase. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for
Buyers? Evidence From Software License Agreements, (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-10, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=799282.
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shrinkwraps put the onus of rejection upon the licensee. The licensor
makes no effort to make the licensee’s access or use of the licensed
product or website contingent upon contract review and approval.
Although the form of such agreements has generally been found
enforceable, a court may still refuse to enforce any particular
agreement if its terms are unconscionable or if any contract defenses
(such as fraud, duress, or mistake) apply.112
The problem with contract-based approaches to software issues
has been in their application.113 Those who use the rhetoric of
contracts have tended to impose a rigid view of contracts that
ignores contract law’s underlying philosophical objectives. Some
scholars and judges have reacted by arguing that contract law is illsuited to address software issues and thus should be supplanted by
policy rationales;114 others have reacted by masking their policy
agenda under the guise of contract law that violates existing rules of
contract formation.115
In fact, modern or “dynamic” contract law is neither as
unrealistic nor as unreasonable as many would suggest. As an
outgrowth of dynamic contract law, the concept of presumed assent
reflects and accommodates the business realities of modern
commercial transactions without wholly ignoring the underlying
objective of contract law to effectuate the intent of contracting
parties. As the next section illustrates, analyzing software transactions
through the lens of dynamic contract law reveals that the licensing
dilemma is more illusion than reality.

112. Professor Hillman has argued that rather than focusing on the technical
requirements of formation and notice, courts should enforce those rolling contract terms that
are conscionable. See Robert A. Hillman, A Tribute to Joseph M. Perillo: Rolling Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 745 (2002).
113. For an interesting discussion of the issues surrounding rolling contracts, see Stephen
E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2006). Professor
Friedman proposes using a “Template Notice,” an intermediate form of disclosure that
contains vital information prior to or at the time of purchase. Id.
114. For example, Viva Moffatt argues that state contract law doctrines are not adequate
vehicles to address fair use restrictions in contracts because they lack uniformity and are
ineffective at policing terms. See Moffatt, supra note 62, at 98–101.
115. See, for example, the Second Circuit’s analysis of contract formation in ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that contract formation occurred after the
sales transaction occurred); see also Dodd, supra note 46, at 198 (stating that applying standard
rules of contract formation to information products “works strange and awful consequences”).
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C. A Dynamic Contracts Approach to Software Transactions
The question of software transactions, or “licensing,” should be
answered by dynamic contract law. According to Professor Melvin
Eisenberg, “dynamic contract law” depends upon a “moving stream
of events that precedes, follows, or constitutes the formation of a
contract” and that has as its objective fulfilling the intent of the
parties and then balancing the parties’ intent with policy
considerations.”116 The initial inquiry in determining the
predominant nature of the transaction under a dynamic contracts
approach concerns the intent of the parties—did the parties to the
software transaction intend for the transaction to be a licensing of
the software or a sale of the software?
At first blush, the question seems superfluous because it is
obvious that at least the licensor intended a licensing arrangement
rather than a sale. “Intent,” however, is in reference to the nature of
the transaction, not the label used to refer to the transaction.117 If
the parties intended for the licensee to obtain ownership of the
physical media as well as the license to use the program contained on
the media (although not ownership of the program), then the parties
intended for a sale of the software product notwithstanding the
labeling of the transaction as a license in any written document
accompanying the product.118
The distinction between the label attached to the transaction and
the nature of the transaction is important considering that in many
types of transactions the label is used in an agreement drafted by one
party that is neither read nor understood by the other party. In many

116. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century: The Emergence
of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1762 (2000).
117. See Rice, supra note 15, at 172 (stating that it is necessary to “look behind labels to
the realities of how program copies are distributed”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus.,
66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977)
(examining the “economic realities” to determine whether a transaction is a license or a sale);
Softman Prods., LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (examining
circumstances of transaction to find a “sale” rather than a license).
118. The UCC adopts a similar approach that looks at the facts of the transaction in
determining whether a contract is a lease or a “disguised sale.” See U.C.C. § 1-203(a) (2003)
(noting that whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or a security interest is
determined by the facts of the case); Carlson v. Giachetti, 616 N.E.2d 810, 812 (Mass. App.
1993) (stating that “the declared intention of the parties, standing alone, cannot be decisive”
in determining whether a stated lease is in fact a lease or a disguised sale but that the “test
certainly must be applied in accordance with the outward appearance of the facts”).
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cases, the type of transaction entered into more accurately reflects
intent than the terms of a written document accompanying the
product. More to the point, in non-negotiated, mass consumer
transactions, the purchase of the license by the consumer is called a
“license” only in the written document; the parties themselves in
referring to the transaction refer to it as a “sale.” Consequently, in
order to determine the intent of the parties, courts should not start
with interpreting the written terms that purport to govern the
transaction; rather, the starting point for analysis should be the
transaction itself. The nature of the transaction then determines what
relevance and meaning to assign to the written terms accompanying
the product.
1. Characterizing the transaction
Under a dynamic contracts approach, a court determines the
intent of the parties in part by examining the nature of the
transaction. In determining whether the parties intended to enter
into a licensing transaction or a sale of software, courts should
consider the following criteria: whether the contract was negotiated,
the structure and timing of license fees, the scope of the license
grant, tax and accounting issues, whether the contract terms are mass
consumer or individualized, the method by which the software is
distributed, the relationship between the software producer and the
software user, the term of the license, and whether the product
eventually must be destroyed or returned to the software
producer.119 A discussion of each of these criteria follows.

119. Professor Rice has identified the following characteristics as those of a sale:
temporally unlimited possession subject to use restrictions that reinforce and extend intangible
rights; unitary rather than serial pricing and payment; subsequent transfer that is neither
prohibited nor conditioned on obtaining the licensor’s prior approval; and the principle
purpose of use restrictions “is to protect intangible copyrightable subject matter, not to
preserve property interests in individual program copies.” Rice, supra note 15, at 172. My
approach incorporates many of the factors identified by Rice; however, under my approach, the
underlying objective of characterizing the transaction is to first determine the intent of the
parties. Furthermore, while Rice recognizes that “nonsale transfer of copies offers a workable
and attractive means for accomplishing clearly legitimate ends” in the commercial market
context, he concludes that “commercial market software distribution presents no new issues
. . . [and] do not legitimate copy use licensing in either [the mass market or commercial
market] context.” Id. at 178–79; see also Elizabeth Winston, Why Sell What You Can License?
Contracting Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93,
121–28 (2006) (setting forth several factors relevant to the determination of whether a
transaction is a license or a sale of intellectual property, including the terms of the contract, the
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a. Negotiated or non-negotiated. The first factor in determining
whether a transaction should be characterized as a pure license or a
sale is whether the parties negotiated the contract or “license
agreement.” The parties to a negotiated contract are aware of the
terms and, regardless of whether they are satisfied with the resolution
of their negotiations, they are aware of the type of transaction they
have entered into by executing the document. Non-negotiated
agreements do not indicate awareness of terms, although the lack of
negotiation does not thereby render the transaction a sale instead of
a license. In other words, a non-negotiated agreement establishes
neither awareness nor ignorance.
b. Structure of license fee/timing and method of payment. Another
relevant factor in characterizing whether a software transaction is a
sale or license is the structure of payment. Is the payment a onetime, paid-up fee? Is it payable in installments? Is payment based
upon use or royalties? If it is a one-time fee, it is more likely that the
parties intended a sale rather than a license. A royalty- or seat-based
license is a factor weighing in favor of finding a licensing
transaction.120 Perhaps the most important factor of all is the timing
and method of payment. If the licensee paid a one-time license fee
prior to being informed of written terms, the terms cannot be viewed
as an “agreement”121 unless they were expressly accepted prior to
payment.122
c. Scope of license grant. Generally, the greater the restrictions
imposed by the licensor, the more likely it is that the transaction was
intended by the licensor to be a pure licensing arrangement; the
fewer the restrictions, the more likely that the licensor intended the
transaction as a sale. I deliberately refer solely to the “licensor”
because in many transactions, the “licensee” may not be aware of the
terms of the license either because the license grant terms were not
made available prior to payment or because the licensee did not
nature of the intellectual property, the pricing structure and the intellectual property owner’s
intellectual property policy).
120. But see Rice, supra note 15, at 177–81 (acknowledging that while site licensing
differs from mass market licensing, the differences do not justify treatment as non-sales).
121. Softman Prods., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (noting as one factor in the determination
of a “sale” that the user paid a one-time fee).
122. In a case where terms are expressly agreed to prior to payment (i.e., prior to
conclusion of the transaction), the transaction may still be a sale, but if in fact it is determined
to be a sale, it would be a “conditional sale” because the sale was conditioned upon acceptance
of certain terms prior to completion.
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bother to read them. There are two mutually exclusive ways of
viewing the scope of a license. The first is as a contractual term. If
the parties expressly negotiate a contract prior to entering into the
sales transaction, then the sale is a conditional one premised upon
adherence to the license grant. The second and alternate way to view
the license grant is as an independent promise made by the licensor
where there is no contract formation prior to completion of the
transaction, i.e., in a “rolling contract” situation. In that case, the
license grant may be interpreted as a promise or statement of policy
by the licensor not to sue for copyright infringement provided that
the licensee adheres to the use restrictions (and provided, of course,
that any fee has been paid). The license grant is not an “agreement”
because both parties have not agreed to the terms; however, if the
licensee exceeds the scope of use provision granted by the licensor,
then the licensor may sue if such use violates the licensor’s rights
under copyright law.
d. Tax and accounting issues. Tax and accounting rules should
also be considered in determining whether a software transaction is a
sale or a license. A license is typically treated in a different manner
from a sale under tax and accounting rules. For example, the
“generally accepted accounting principles” or “GAAP” distinguish
sales of goods from consulting or services commitments.123 In mass
consumer transactions, if a software producer recognizes a “sale”
upon shipment of the product, then it seems inconsistent to say that
the transaction is recognized by the software producer as merely an
offer that has yet to be accepted by the consumer, as has been stated
in the rolling contract situation.124 Similarly, the accounting and
accrual method used by the purchaser should be helpful in
determining whether the purchaser intended that the transaction be
a sale rather than a licensing or leasing transaction.
e. Mass consumer or individualized license terms. The fifth factor
to consider is whether the license has individualized or standard mass
consumer terms. In pure licensing transactions, the parties are more
likely to expressly negotiate the terms of the license. The licensor
may be more flexible depending upon its bargaining power vis-à-vis
123. See Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 86, Accounting for the Costs of
Computer Software To Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed; Statement of Position No. 97-2,
Software Revenue Recognition (setting forth how software and maintenance revenues are to be
recognized over the term of the contract).
124. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
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the licensee with whom it is negotiating terms. The individualized
terms reflect consideration of the licensee’s business and intended
use of the software. In mass consumer transactions, the license terms
reflect a business model that is not tailored to the needs of an
individual customer but is geared toward a class or type of consumer.
The terms of use for mass market consumer software are
standardized and the licensor does not care about the identity of any
particular consumer so long as that consumer is able to pay the
requisite product price. The consumer’s expectations are also
different from those of a licensee seeking specific terms with a
licensor. The consumer is responsible for determining whether the
software product meets its intended purposes based upon publicly
available information. Where the parties are agreeing to
individualized terms, there is awareness on both sides of the
particular needs of the software user and the limitations of the
software product.
There is usually overlap between this factor and the first factor
(i.e., whether the terms of the license agreement have been
negotiated), but the two factors are not necessarily the same. The
licensor may establish individualized licensing terms for the licensee’s
operating system that are not subject to negotiation; on the other
hand, the parties may negotiate pricing terms for software even
though the use of the software may be subject to standard consumer
license terms.
f. Method of distribution. Another factor that should be
considered in determining whether a transaction is a license or a sale
is the method by which the software is distributed. Software can
either be sold directly from the software producer to the software
user or it can be distributed by a third party. If the software is
distributed through a third party, the role of that third party must be
determined. For example, is that third party an authorized
“sublicensor”? While the software producer may claim that it
“licenses” the software to the end user, is this a claim that the retailer
can credibly make? Is the retailer or third party acting as an
authorized agent of the software producer? The implications for
third parties are further discussed in Part V. For now, it is sufficient
to acknowledge that the method of software distribution is relevant
in assessing whether the parties intended a license or a sale
transaction. If the third party is not authorized to act on behalf of
the software producer, then the transaction is more likely to be a
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sale; if the third party is an authorized sublicensor or agent of the
software producer, then that factor weighs in favor of finding a
licensing transaction.
g. Existence and nature of ongoing relationship. If the software
producer and the software user contemplate an ongoing relationship,
the parties may have intended a pure licensing, rather than a sales,
transaction.125 An ongoing relationship may be evidenced by the
provision of ancillary services, such as consulting or implementing
services, or maintaining the software. The relational nature of the
parties is important in determining the character of the transaction
because each may have an effect on the other. The parties may have
agreed to certain licensing terms based upon the ancillary services
agreement or vice versa. In a sales transaction, the parties typically do
not contemplate an ongoing relationship other than that necessary to
recover for defective merchandise under applicable state warranties.
h. Term of license. Perhaps one of the most important factors in
assessing the nature of a transaction is the term of the license grant.
If the license is a perpetual one—especially if it is a perpetual, nonexclusive license—the parties almost certainly contemplated a sale
rather than a licensing transaction. If the term of the license grant is
for a specified period of time, the parties probably contemplated a
pure licensing transaction.
i. Destruction or return of product. The final factor to consider in
characterizing the nature of the transaction is whether the software
product eventually must be returned or destroyed upon expiration or
termination of the license grant.126 It is not, however, determinative

125. See Maureen O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 493–95 (1995). O’Rourke
observes that software providers
[g]enerally contract with end users in one of three ways. At one end of the spectrum
are individually negotiated transactions, usually between two competent, informed
parties. Often these transactions reflect a long-term relationship between the parties
and involve customized software. . . . At the other end of the licensing spectrum are
the familiar shrink wrap agreements. . . . In the middle . . . are contracts that are
signed by the licensee, but are generally not negotiated.
Id. O’Rourke’s observations are consistent with this author’s own experience as a
licensing and business attorney at several Silicon Valley software companies.
126. This factor was crucial to the court’s decision in the Autodesk case discussed in the
opening paragraph of this Article. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169
(W.D. Wash 2008). The Vernor court based its conclusion that the transaction was a sale,
rather than a license, upon the Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th
Cir. 1977). See Vernor, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. At issue in Wise were transfer contracts
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given the ease with which software products can be copied. Unlike
with non-digital goods, the return of a compact disc containing the
software does not indicate that the user has in fact transferred all
software to the software producer. Nevertheless, when the parties
include a provision requiring return or destruction of software, they
are acknowledging that the right to use the software may expire or
terminate at some point in time, which indicates that parties
intended a license rather than a sale of the software product.
The above factors are not exhaustive, although they are likely to
be the most important criteria in determining the nature of the
transaction. Different software transactions require different business
models. As a general matter, producers of enterprise-wide software in
a commercial environment may find it necessary or prudent to
employ a pure licensing scheme,127 whereas producers of mass market
consumer software may use the label “license” merely to effectuate
otherwise invalid restraints on alienability of personal property.
2. Presumed assent and the effect of the license “agreement”
After characterizing a transaction as a sale or license using the
criteria discussed above, the courts can then determine the effect of
the written document accompanying the product. If the parties
intended to enter into a pure licensing transaction, the terms of the
written license agreement govern the transaction provided that they

between movie studios and recipients of movie prints, some of which that court found to be
licenses and others to be sales. Vernor, 550 F.2d at 1184. The Vernor court stated that “(i)n
comparing the transactions found to be sales in Wise with those that were not, the critical
factor is whether the transferee kept the copy acquired from the copyright holder.” 555 F.
Supp. 2d at 1170. In Vernor, however, the court distinguished between the return of the
product and destruction of the product, finding that destruction was insufficient to negate a
sale. Id. The Vernor court interpreted Wise to mean that “[e]ven a complete prohibition on
further transfer . . . or a requirement that the print be salvaged or destroyed, was insufficient to
negate a sale where the transferee was not required to return the print.” Id. There is a
significant difference, however, where the object subject to the license or sale is a non-digital
item, such as a film print, and where the object is software, which can be readily copied. With
digital products, the return of the object is not mutually exclusive with retention by the
software user. In such case, a promise to destroy the object may be more effective than mere
return of the product.
127. See Rice, supra note 15, at 178 (“Differentiating factors such as the character of
relationships and business purposes served make title reservation and related use limitation
seem more appropriate in commercial market settings. . . . [but i]t does not follow, a fortiori,
that copy use licensing is a statutorily permitted form of transfer in the limited distribution of
program copies.”).
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are otherwise enforceable under contract law. Whether the written
terms are binding as an agreement upon the parties depends on
whether there was valid contract formation and no invalidating
circumstances (such as unconscionability or duress). If the document
fails as an agreement—for example, because there was a lack of assent
on the part of the licensee—the license grant provisions have
independent effect as a statement of the licensor’s policies in much
the same way they would in a sales transaction.
Courts tend to find contract formation even where the usual
actions that constitute a sales transaction—the payment by a buyer,
the acceptance of payment by a seller, and the exercise of dominion
and control by the buyer with the seller’s knowledge and consent—
were completed prior to receipt of license terms. This finding of
assent by courts is an accommodation to the realities of the
marketplace that, unfortunately, misapplies formalistic contract rules.
In many cases, the transaction is completed under rules of offer and
acceptance before the written terms are made available to the
“licensee.”128 In such cases, it does not make sense to review the
terms as part of the bargain between the two parties.
Notwithstanding the failure of the parties to expressly agree to
the written terms of a contract, there is an understanding between
the parties that the transaction has certain parameters, and that those
parameters will define the relationship between the parties. Even if
terms are not expressly agreed to, both parties understand that
certain terms nevertheless govern their relationship. These terms
govern the relationship not because the licensee has in fact agreed to
them, but because the licensee’s rights derive from and are defined
by those terms.129 Elsewhere, I have used the term “presumed
assent” to refer to the concept that the licensee, by agreeing to the
transaction, may also be presumed to have assented to certain
contract terms.130 The licensee’s assent to certain terms may be
presumed because the licensee’s right to use the software is
conditioned upon assent to those terms. In a typical mass consumer

128. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
129. See also William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1212 (1998) (“[T]he question of the proper scope of intellectual property
rights on the Internet and the question of the proper magnitude of contractual freedom on the
Internet should be understood as interdependent. Neither can be resolved sensibly without
attention to the other.”).
130. See Kim, supra note 93, at 818–19.
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software transaction, both parties understand that the consumer
intends to use the software in exchange for a sum of money. The
consumer understands that the software producer may set the price it
wishes, and the software producer understands that the consumer
may use the software if it pays that price. As further explained in this
Part, the consumer’s assent may be presumed with respect to the
license grant or scope of use provision provided that such provisions
do not impose an affirmative obligation upon the licensee or deprive
the licensee of a legal right that exists independently of the license
grant.131
A software producer has certain exclusive rights to the
intellectual property embodied in the software product that enable it
to engage in certain activities; accordingly, anyone other than the
software producer may not engage in those activities without the
software producer’s consent.132 In granting a license, the software
producer is giving such consent and thereby relinquishes its exclusive
right to the software. Yet, it is within the discretion of the software
producer how much of its exclusive rights to give up or share with

131. Id. at 819–26.
132. It may be useful to consider the concept of presumed assent in Hohfeldian terms.
Wesley Hohfeld noted that certain legal terms are used indiscriminately to cover different legal
concepts or relationships. He set up a well-known typology of jural opposites and jural
correlatives to elucidate the scope and application of these concepts. See generally Hohfeld,
supra note 43. For the purposes of this Article, I focus on Hohfeld’s conception of “rights and
duties” and “privileges and ‘no-rights.’” Hohfeld limited and sharpened the definition of
“rights” by pointing out that its correlative was “duty,” so that “if X has a right against Y that
he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty
toward X to stay off the place.” A privilege is the jural opposite of duty and the correlative of
“no right” so that if X in the above example has a right against Y, X himself has the
“privilege” of entering upon the land and has “no duty” to stay off the land and Y has “noright” to keep X from entering the land. Id. at 31–32 (italics added). If a software producer
grants a license to a consumer, the consumer then has the privilege of using the software,
meaning that it has no duty to refrain from using the software (a duty that it would otherwise
have if not for the grant of license by the software producer). Hohfeld notes that the term
“license” is “a generic term to indicate a group of operative facts required to create a particular
privilege.” Id. at 44 (emphasis in original).
In order to minimize confusion and pretentiousness, and in recognition of the ordinary
usage of the word “rights” to include “privileges,” I will use the term “rights” to encompass
“privileges.” As Max Radin observed, Hohfeld’s insistence that “privileges” not be called rights
“unfortunately contradicts so fully established a usage both in law and literature, that it is idle
to suppose that any terminological reform will overcome it. So clearly are [certain] ‘privileges’
rights, that they are usually the first thing that are thought of as rights when the word occurs
in speech.” Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1938).
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the software user; those rights that are not given up or shared are
reserved to the software producer.
On the other hand, the software user also has rights that the
software producer does not control and that have nothing to do with
whether and how the software is used. I will refer to these rights as
“non-derivative” because they do not derive or flow from the license
conferred by the software producer or from any exclusive rights of
the software producer. Only the scope of the software user’s right to
use the software is subject to the software producer’s control,
because it derives from the license grant. Without the license grant,
the software user would have no right to use the software due to the
exclusive rights reserved to the software producer under copyright
law.
The non-derivative rights of the software user, by contrast, do
not exist as a result of the grant conferred by the software producer.
Accordingly, the software producer cannot take away or restrict nonderivative rights—those rights may only be relinquished or restricted
by the rights’ holders themselves (i.e., the software users). In other
words, the software producer may expand or increase a consumer’s
right to exploit the software, but she may not encumber the
consumer’s non-derivative rights without obtaining the consumer’s
actual assent. The consumer may use the software but cannot do
anything else with it—such as distribute it or make copies (which is a
right reserved exclusively to the software owner under the Copyright
Act)—unless such a right is expressly granted by the software owner
or permitted as a “fair use” under the first sale doctrine. The
consumer’s assent to “only use” the software is presumed; any
greater use may be a violation of the licensor’s intellectual property
rights unless that right exists independently of the licensor’s grant of
rights to the consumer.
On the other hand, if the licensor wishes to impose greater
restrictions or affirmative obligations upon the consumer, then the
consumer would need to actually assent to such terms because the
licensor’s rights over the software do not include the power to
diminish the consumer’s non-derivative rights. For example, the
licensor can, without the licensee’s express consent, prohibit the
licensee from making copies of the software. The licensor cannot,
however, mandate arbitration without the licensee’s actual assent as
the ability to file a lawsuit is a non-derivative right that exists
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independently of the right to use the software afforded by the license
grant.133
The concept of presumed assent is integral to the first part of a
dynamic contracts analysis because it reflects the parties’ awareness
and willingness to enter into a transaction in which the licensee gains
only certain rights with respect to a product and the licensor retains
certain rights over that product—this contrasts from traditional sales
transactions where one party relinquished all rights to a product that
the other party acquired. If the facts indicate that the parties
intended to enter into a transaction for the sale of a software
product, then, despite the fact that the licensor may refer to the
transaction as a “license” in a written document accompanying the
product (or a digital agreement contained in the product), the
transaction is in fact a sale. One party should not have the power to
change the nature of a transaction by unilaterally inserting a written
document into product packaging.134
On the other hand, the fact that the transaction is a sale does not
mean that the written terms accompanying the product are
meaningless. The written document establishes what the licensor
agrees to—it sets forth the licensor’s warranty policies, disclaimers,
contact information, and other useful information. The validity of
the warranty disclaimers depends on whether they conform to the
applicable UCC and Magnuson Moss provisions. In other words, the
written document states the licensor’s obligations, but it does not
necessarily serve as an effective limitation of those obligations unless
those limitations conform to applicable law.135 The document is not

133. The desirability of actual assent is reflected in the abundance of spyware that many
consumers unwittingly authorize via clickwraps. See Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by
Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1346 (2005) (“[F]or contract law to provide a
meaningful constraint on the distribution of spyware programs, a major revision of current
contract law would be required.”). Winn further predicts that
[g]iven the strong trend in recent cases favoring the enforcement of clickwrap
agreements in the absence of a conflict between contract terms and fundamental
public policy of the forum, or evidence of misconduct so egregious that it might rise
to the level of unconscionable, courts are likely to find that adware EULAs are
enforceable contracts.
Id. at 1353.
134. As Raymond Nimmer states, “Labels are useful. But labels should not be allowed to
muddy one’s analysis of the actual transaction and the terms it conveys.” RAYMOND T.
NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 5.5, 255 (2007 ed.).
135. For example, the UCC requires that disclaimers of implied warranties be
conspicuous. UCC § 2-316(2) (2003).
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an “agreement” in that it does not express what the licensee has
agreed to, but it is contractual in the sense that the licensee is
presumed to agree to the licensor’s written policies insofar as such
written policies conform to other applicable law. Furthermore,
because the licensee never agreed to the terms, the written document
should not curtail any rights that the licensee would otherwise have.
The tension between the licensor’s rights and obligations as a
business owner and seller and the licensee’s rights and obligations as
a consumer and product owner is most apparent in the license grant
or scope of use provision.
a. What effect does the license grant/scope of use provision have in a
sale transaction? The software licensing dilemma falsely constructs a
binary proposition that pits software producers against software users
in an all-or-nothing struggle against each other. In fact, the sale of a
software product does not exclude a license of the software program.
On the contrary, in a software product sale, the user purchases both
the medium that contains the software as well as a license to use the
software program. (Of course, users may also simply download the
program from a website. In that case, the software product sale
would consist only of the sale of the license to use the software
product and any help desk services and downloadable
documentation.)136 The user does not acquire the software program
or code itself, nor does the user acquire the underlying intellectual
property rights to the program.137 What the user purchases in a sales
transaction is the right to use the software program on a computer
system under certain conditions and subject to certain restrictions.138
The purchase of a software product does not mean that the licensee
can do whatever it wishes with the software.139 A license is a promise
136. But see Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A Proposal for a
Federal Common Law of Contract, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 979 (2004) (questioning whether
there can be a “first sale” in the absence of the exchange of some tangible copy).
137. See Chin, supra note 42, at 5 (“The purchaser of a software product does not
acquire plenary property rights in the accompanying software; rather, he or she purchases legal
rights and technological capabilities to use certain services that may be performed by his or her
computer system when the accompanying software is installed and executed on the system
under certain specified conditions. The purchase of a software product is not the purchase of
software code, but the purchase of these rights and capabilities.”).
138. Id. at 26–28 (distinguishing software from the software product, which includes the
right to use the code). In this Article, I use the term “software” the way an average consumer
would, to refer to both the code and the product, unless otherwise specified.
139. As David Rice points out, the Copyright Act recognizes the distinction between
tangible property rights in copies of a work and intangible property rights in the creation itself.
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not to sue for infringement or misuse provided the licensee adheres
to the terms of the license grant. The use of that software is subject
to the license terms, at least to the extent that those terms do not
exceed the licensor’s authority. If the licensee exceeds the license
grant, the licensor may sue on any available cause of action that
stems from use beyond the terms of the license grant since the
license (the promise not to sue) pertained only to use within those
boundaries.140 In other words, the license grant in a sales transaction
is simply a promise by the licensor that it will not sue provided that
certain use restrictions are adhered to; it is enforceable as a statement
of the limitations on the licensor and the licensor’s obligations.
Whether or not the licensee agrees to the license grant in a sales
transaction is irrelevant; this is what the licensor is permitting and
what it is prohibiting. For example, I can walk into a clothing store
that has a “no money back, only exchanges or store credit” policy. I
might not like that policy, and I did not really agree to the policy (in
many cases, I might not even be aware of the policy), but it does not
matter because the store sets its own merchandise return policy. The
store is still subject to state-implied warranties, but provided that the
clothing meets commercial merchantability standards, the store is
not required to accept returns and provide refunds. Adherence to the
policy is contractual in the sense that I am presumed to have agreed
to that policy, even if I have not actually read the policy at the time
of purchase. Nonetheless, the policy is enforceable if it meets the
minimum state warranty requirements.
If, however, the licensor purports to restrict the use of the
software product in a way that is unexpected or otherwise
unreasonable (i.e., narrower than one would think is typically
allowed to the owner of a copy of software), and assuming that,

For instance, section 106 allows an owner of copyrights, by any means of
conveyance, to authorize others to make copies of a protected work, prepare a
derivative work or distribute copies of the original. However, the transfer of rights
comprised in a copyright, including the distribution right, is governed by section
201(d) rather than by section 106(3). The difference is significant, a fact made clear
by the section 202 declaration that transfer of a copy conveys no rights in the work
fixed therein and that transfer of copyright carries no property rights in any copy.
Rice, supra note 15, at 166–67.
140. But see Gibbons, supra note 136, at 977–78 (“Once the first sale has occurred, even
if a buyer disregards the copyright owner’s express restrictions on the use of the copyrighted
work, the buyer is not liable for copyright infringement, but the buyer may still be liable for
breach of contract.”).
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based on an analysis of the factors set forth in Part III.C.1, the
transaction is in fact a sale rather than a true licensing transaction,
the restriction is not binding on the licensee; rather, it is an
unenforceable attempt to limit the licensor’s liabilities or
responsibilities.
The written document contained with the software product
provides useful information given the lack of standards established by
existing law regarding the extent of the licensor’s rights to control
the software, but that does not mean it is accurate or even binding.
It is the licensor’s statement of what it has allowed the licensee, and
of what it believes its own obligations are.141 The licensee is
presumed to have assented to the terms of that policy, but only with
respect to the use of the software. If the licensee exceeds the scope of
use, then the licensee is subject to any infringement claims available
to the licensor—although such claims would not include breach of
contract because the licensee has not actually agreed that he would
abide by those license terms prior to purchasing the software
product.
The license grant in a sale transaction then is a grant of rights to
the licensee and a reservation of rights by the licensor; it is also a
statement of the limitations on the licensor and the licensor’s
obligations. The license grant sets forth which rights the licensor
makes available to the licensee. The license grant does not, and
cannot, take away rights from the licensee that do not derive from
the rights granted by the licensor. The licensor can grant rights to
the licensee, and it can reserve other rights to itself, but it cannot
unilaterally restrict the non-derivative rights that are otherwise
available to the licensee.
b. What happens where the licensee exceeds rights granted by the
licensor? The foregoing addresses the impact or legal significance of
the written agreement that accompanies a software product. It also
discusses the importance and relevance of the license grant or scope
of use provision. Part IV of this Article addresses what happens
where a licensor claims that the licensee has exceeded the scope of
use or license grant rights, and explains how to determine whether
the scope of use or license grant provision has in fact been violated.

141. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agreements,
26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 508–09 (2003) (noting that some common provisions in
browsewrap agreements seek merely to explain or characterize the Web site’s business).
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It is important to recognize that not every restriction in a written
document is a scope of use or license grant provision regardless of
the caption or paragraph heading under which it is contained. In
some cases, a restriction contained in the paragraph with the heading
“scope of use” may not in fact be a use restriction; on the other
hand, albeit less likely, a scope of use restriction may be contained in
a paragraph with a heading other than “License Grant” or “Scope of
Use.” Whether a provision is in fact a restriction on the use of the
product will depend on how the provision is drafted and how the
court interprets it.142 In interpreting any particular provision, the
courts should be mindful of the nature of the transaction—that of a
sale as opposed to a licensing transaction—and not just the meaning
of the written terms devoid of context.143 Accordingly, “scope of
use” in a mass market sales transaction should refer to how the
product is used, not who uses it. In mass consumer sales transactions,
the licensor has no particular interest in the identity of the licensee; it
cares only that the licensee can pay the asking price for the product.
On the other hand, in a pure licensing transaction, the identity of the
licensee is much more relevant and important to the licensor and
might be considered a scope of use restriction.
If the particular use of the software in fact exceeds the license
grant, then the licensor would be entitled to sue for infringement.
Because the promise to forbear from pursuing an infringement claim
extends only to use within certain parameters, and since the licensee
transgressed those parameters, the promise to not sue does not

142. See NIMMER & DODD, supra note 134, § 6.5, 315 (“In practice, contractual
restrictions about a licensee’s use of subject matter may be in either a scope provision or a
separate promise (covenant). The distinction lies not in what limits are agreed to or whether
the limits are contractual in nature [sic] contain an implicit promise to not exceed them, but in
how the parties draft the license and, ultimately, how a court interprets the license terms in the
event of dispute.”).
143. As Nimmer and Dodd note:
Contextual approaches to contract interpretation often have meaning solely for the
particular agreement and carry limited precedential value beyond the particular
agreement. This returns us to a basic theme of contract law: terms of each
commercial deal should be read in light of the relationship of the parties (a routinely
applied common law and commercial law theme). Expectations are quite different in
remote-use licenses as contrasted to development or end user contracts. Product
licenses entail different expectations that do [sic] system or process licenses. The
same language used in one license may confer quite different rights when used in
another.
Id. § 6.6, 318–19.
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pertain to the licensee’s excessive or out-of-scope use. The licensor
then would not sue the licensee for breach of a contract; rather, it
would exercise rights available to it under copyright law.
IV. APPLYING A DYNAMIC APPROACH: TWO EXAMPLES
The enforceability of software license agreements tends to arise
most frequently with two provisions, both of which purport to
restrict the licensee’s use of the software. The first provision limits
the licensee’s ability to transfer or sell its copy of the software
product. The second provision restricts the licensee’s use of the
software to only “non-commercial” purposes. I will analyze each of
these provisions in turn in order to demonstrate how to apply a
dynamic approach to software licenses.
A. Example 1: Restrictions on Transferability
The following provision is typical of license grant provisions
restricting transfer of software:
2.1 License Grant. [Licensor] grants You a non-sublicensable, nonexclusive, non-transferable, limited license to use a single copy of
the Software . . . in accordance with the applicable User
Documentation, within the scope of the License Parameters.144

There may also be a separate section governing prohibited uses
of the software:
3.2 Prohibited Actions. [Licensor] does not permit any of the
following actions and licensee acknowledges that such actions shall
be prohibited:

...
3.2.3 Transfers. You may not distribute, rent, loan, lease, sell,
sublicense, or otherwise transfer all or any portion of the Software
or Documentation, or Your Product(s), in whole or in part, or any
rights granted in this Agreement, to any other person without the
prior written consent of [Licensor].145

The first step in a dynamic contracts analysis is to determine what
type of transaction was intended by the parties using the factors
144. See Autodesk’s agreement, available at http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/
item?siteID=123112&id=7565485.
145. See id.
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outlined in Part III.C.1. If it is determined that the parties intended
to enter into a pure licensing transaction, then the prohibition
regarding transferability should be enforceable as a contractual
obligation provided that it is not otherwise unenforceable under an
available contract defense, such as unconscionability, mistake, fraud,
or duress. If the transaction is determined to be a sales transaction,146
the restriction fails as a covenant because the provision is not one
that was agreed to by the software user.
Notwithstanding the failure of the restriction as a contractual
obligation, can the licensor sue for infringement on the grounds that
the licensee has exceeded the scope of use rights granted by the
licensor? The second step after determining the nature of the
transaction is to determine the type of restriction imposed upon the
licensee. A prohibition on the transferability of software is ineffective
as a scope of use term because the licensor loses its ability to impose
such a prohibition as soon as it has sold the software without such a
prohibition. In other words, in a sales transaction, the rights arising
from the first sale doctrine attach to the licensee’s purchase of the
software from the moment of purchase. Even assuming, arguendo,
that the licensor has the power to contractually restrict the
transferability of the software if it had in fact done so prior to the sale
taking place, the fact that it did not do so means that it has lost that
right. The licensor cannot, after the sale transaction, reserve a right
that it no longer has, nor can it deprive the licensee of a right that
was not dependent upon, or derivative of, the license for its
existence.
The restriction on transferability has significance in that it sets
forth the licensor’s proclaimed limitations on the obligations of the
licensor with respect to third-party transferees. For example, while
the attempted prohibition on transfer is not effective to prevent a
licensee-purchaser from transferring the license, the licensor is not
required to provide support to non-registered transferees. Whether
or not the licensor’s proclaimed obligations (or lack thereof) to third
parties are in fact valid will then depend on state law governing
consumer sales transactions.
146. It is possible that the parties may enter into a conditional sale transaction whereby
the terms of the sale are expressly negotiated prior to the purchase of the software by the user.
In most cases involving software, however, it is unlikely that a software producer who expends
the resources necessary to engage in individually negotiated contracts would engage in a
conditional sale, rather than a licensing, transaction.
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B. Example 2: “Non-Commercial Use Only” or “Personal Use Only”
A dynamic approach to contract interpretation extends beyond a
simple textual analysis. Because the objective is to determine the
intent of the parties, as with the foregoing analysis regarding
restrictions on transferability, the first step in analyzing the validity of
“non-commercial use only” or “personal use only” restrictions is to
determine the nature of the transaction. Many “non-commercial use
only” licenses are issued by educational institutions and, by
definition, are not part of a sales transaction because there is no
license fee. Assuming that, based upon an analysis of the factors set
forth in Part III.C.1., the transaction is one for the sale of the
software product rather than a licensing transaction,147 the next step
is to determine whether the restriction is, as a matter of
interpretation, to be construed as a restriction on the scope of use or
whether it is an attempted contractual restriction.148
1. Interpreting the intent of the parties
The following is an example of a license where the “noncommercial use” restriction is clearly intended by the licensor
(although not intended by the licensee) to be part of the scope of
use and not a restrictive covenant:
1. General. A non-exclusive, nontransferable, perpetual license is
granted to the Licensee to install and use the Software for
academic, non-profit, or government-sponsored research purposes.
Use of the Software under this License is restricted to noncommercial purposes. Commercial use of the Software requires a
separately executed written license agreement.
2. Permitted Use and Restrictions. Licensee agrees that it will
use the Software, and any modifications, improvements, or
derivatives to the Software that the Licensee may create
(collectively, “Improvements”) solely for internal, non-commercial
purposes and shall not distribute or transfer the Software or
Improvements to any person or third parties without prior written
permission from the Licensor. The term “non-commercial,” as

147. As discussed in the previous Part, if the transaction is deemed to be a pure licensing
one, the license agreement would govern as a contract subject to any available contract
defenses.
148. In addition to the concerns raised in this Article regarding limitations on software
use, there may be antitrust implications. See generally Chin, supra note 42.
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used in this License, means academic or other scholarly research
which (a) is not undertaken for profit, or (b) is not intended to
produce works, services, or data for commercial use, or (c) is
neither conducted, nor funded, by a person or an entity engaged in
the commercial use, application or exploitation of works similar to
the Software.149

Often it is difficult to understand precisely what “noncommercial use” or “personal use only” means. In some documents,
the terms mean that the software should not be productized or that
the software should not be leased or rented. Such use of the software
is also prohibited by the Copyright Act,150 and the provision would
then serve the useful purpose of informing the user of what activities
constitute infringement. In some documents, however, the terms
refer to the type of entity that purchased the software and would not
qualify as a scope of use limitation.
2. Policy considerations in interpreting “non-commercial use/personal
use only” clauses
In addition to determining the intent of the parties with respect
to the “non-commercial use/personal use only” provision, a
dynamic approach takes into account policy considerations. Because
the license terms in a written document accompanying a mass market
software product do not reflect the intent of both the parties, policy
considerations take on heightened significance.
a. Scope of use restrictions should be construed narrowly in mass
market licenses. As discussed above, in a sale of a mass market
software product, the license “agreement” does not reflect a meeting
of the minds between the parties. The transfer of title to the software
copy and the purchase of the right to use that software have already
been completed. The interpretation of the purchaser’s “right to use”
should conform to reasonable expectations and avoid any unfair
surprises.151 The grant is enforceable not because it has been agreed
to by the licensee, but because the licensor has the right to set
parameters of use. Notwithstanding the licensor’s rights as the

149. This license provision is substantially similar to one used by the University of
California, San Francisco, available at http://www.cgl.ucsf.edu/chimera/license.html.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1997).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
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copyright holder, however, the licensee has certain rights as a
consumer.
If the restriction were in fact related to the functionality or the
function-ability of the software, it is more likely to be interpreted as a
scope of use restriction. If the non-commercial use restriction is
directed at the identity of the user, the provision should be
interpreted as an unenforceable covenant. In a sales transaction, and
especially in a mass market sales transaction, the licensor is not
concerned with the identity of the purchaser as long as the purchaser
can pay for the software. In the following example, the “personal
use” limitation purports to restrict not how the software is used, but
by whom the software is used:
This License entitles you to install the Software on a maximum of
two personal computers (laptops/desktops) for your personal use
only. “Install” means to place in temporary memory or permanent
storage on the computer. “Personal use” means use exclusively by
the Registered User and does not include use by your business
associates, partners, employees or co-workers. Each user of the
Software must purchase his or her own individual License.152

The “personal use” limitation fails both as a restrictive covenant,
because the user never agreed to the term prior to completion of the
sale, and as a scope-of-use limitation, because as an interpretive
matter, it does not address how the software is used, but by whom it
is used (provided that it is only installed, i.e., copied, on two
computers at any time). The limiting clause may be relevant,
however, in determining the licensor’s obligations and liabilities for
non-personal use of the software. For example, a manufacturer of
paint may label its cans as being “for interior use only,” but such a
label does not mean that the purchaser is legally prohibited from
using the paint for exteriors. What it does mean, however, is that the
paint is not made to withstand exterior weather conditions and that
the purchaser should not expect that it will. It thus serves to limit the
manufacturer’s liability by setting appropriate standards and
expectations for the product.
b. Price discrimination should not be the sole purpose. In some
cases, software is labeled “for personal use only” because the version
is in development and intended only for evaluation or development
152. This provision was copied from a Real Data software license agreement, available at
http://www.realdata.com/p/license.shtml.
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purposes. In such cases, however, the transaction engaged in by the
software producer and the user is a pure licensing transaction rather
than a sale. In other cases, the distinction between personal and
commercial use is intended only to effectuate a price differentiation
strategy.153 From the software producer’s standpoint, differential
pricing is an easy and effective way to maximize profits and sales.154
Software producers should be able to price their products differently
based upon the targeted buyer; however, their ability to do so should
depend upon implementing innovative business practices, strategic
control of distribution channels, and qualitative differences in
product offerings. Pricing discretion should not depend on restrictive
covenants in contracts that were never agreed to, or upon license
restrictions that are difficult to understand and police.155 This section
explains why policy considerations dictate that non-commercial
use/personal-use-only licenses should not be enforced in a sales
transaction simply to effectuate a price differentiation strategy.
(1) The pricing dilemma is not unique to the software
industry. The pricing dilemma faced by software producers is no
different from that faced by producers in other industries. As a
general matter, businesses in all industries want their customers to
pay the highest price they are willing to pay—the problem for them
is figuring out what that price is. Certain customers might also value
a particular product, at a certain price; other customers might value a
particular product but only at a much lower price. Some businesses
have learned to address the issue of consumer demand by offering
qualitatively different products. The publishing industry, for
example, regularly issues books in hardcover several months to a year
before publishing the same books in paperback. While many
customers may be willing to pay a premium for the privilege of
reading a book when it is first released, other customers may only
purchase that book at a reduced price. The publishing industry thus

153. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996); Christian H.
Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software Licenses Really Sales, and How Will
the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q. J. 555 (2004).
154. See Fisher, supra note 129, at 1234–40.
155. But see id. at 1238–40 (arguing that price discrimination has substantial benefits,
including improvements in distributive justice because more consumers can access intellectual
works and there is a reduction in social welfare losses). For a discussion of price discrimination
and goods protected by copyright, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price
Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).
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accommodates differing customer demands by issuing hardcovers
first and paperbacks later.156 Publishers are able to justify the price
differential by printing the earlier versions in hardback.
Businesses have different ways of dealing with customers who
may challenge their business models. Scholastic Books, for example,
regularly sells paperback versions of children’s books to school
markets at greatly reduced prices. Such books (often originally
printed by publishers other than Scholastic) contain a legend on
their back covers that states, “This edition is for distribution by
schools only.” The legend reflects Scholastic’s practice of not selling
these books to retail outlets—and discourages purchasers who intend
to buy books from Scholastic and resell them to retail outlets at a
profit. Retailers are discouraged from buying these books from
unscrupulous third parties because doing so reflects poorly on the
retailers. It does not, however, prevent purchasers from reselling
their copies of books on eBay, for example, or to used book stores.
Another example is Estée Lauder, which often gives “gifts with
purchase.” These miniature-sized cosmetics often contain the words,
“not for individual sale” on their containers. This discourages resale
of these products and puts potential purchasers on notice that they
are not getting the full-sized item and should not be paying for the
sample. The notice “not for individual sale” brings into question the
integrity of the reseller (and the safety of the sample-sized,
unauthorized-by-the-manufacturer, resold product). Furthermore,
music groups with fan clubs have a long history of trying to thwart
scalpers who may buy up tickets and prevent true fans from
attending concerts. They have employed various strategies to address
the scalping problem, such as requiring proof of identification at
ticket pick-up and tracking multiple fan club memberships.157
As these examples illustrate, businesses in all industries must deal
with customers who refuse to play by the rules set by these
businesses—and they typically do so by controlling their channels of
distribution, not by unilaterally imposing overbroad pseudocontractual restrictions. In fact, in many ways software manufacturers
can police product use more easily than other types of businesses.
156. See Nadan, supra note 153, at 578–79; R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in
the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 591 (2002).
157. See Joseph De Avila, A Controversial Way to Score Concert Tickets: Emerging
Secondary Market in ‘Presale’ Passwords Irks Dues-Supported Fan Clubs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
2007, at D1.
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Software companies can make registration a prerequisite of
maintenance and support or help desk services. Alternatively, they
can charge more for software support services based upon anticipated
increased use in the need for support. They can build mechanisms
into their products that restrict use.158 There are indications that
denying the software industry preferential treatment might actually
encourage socially beneficial changes to existing business models.159
For example, many software companies now make a larger
percentage of their revenues from selling services than selling
products.160
(2) The line between personal and commercial use of
software is often blurred. As a practical matter, with some types of
software it is difficult to separate commercial from non-commercial
use, especially if the meaning of “non-commercial use” or “personal
use” is ambiguous in the written document. For example, a
consumer may purchase a “personal use only” version of a word
processing software product and intend to use the software to
compose personal letters. She may also work for a company and
often take work home, where she composes documents using her
“personal use only” software. Has she violated the scope of license?
What if she purchased graphic design software because she wanted to
design her own birthday cards and then decided to start a business
because creating cards was much easier than she thought? Does she
have to switch from one program to another depending on the
project that she is working on? At what point is she considered a
“commercial” customer—with her first paying customer? With her
tenth?161

158. See Hardy, supra note 55, at 236–58 (discussing how the costs of drawing and
monitoring “borders” in cyberspace may be lower than for other informational works).
159. See Nancy Kim, Internet Challenges to Business Innovation, 12 J. OF INTERNET LAW
3 (2008).
160. See Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value: A Radical New Way of Looking at
Compensation for Owners and Creators in the Net-based Economy, 3.07 WIRED 136, 141 (July
1, 1995) (noting that “while most packaged software vendors continue to fight the perennial
battle against software piracy, others have chosen to begin adopting a different business
model” that depends upon compensation for “services rather than for code”). Microsoft’s chief
executive, Steven A. Ballmer, recently acknowledged that the company was making an effort to
adapt “to the opportunities and risks of a more connected, more services-oriented world,”
reflecting consumer shift away from using software on a PC and to services on the Web. Steve
Lohr, Microsoft Will Share More Secrets, N.Y. TIMES., Feb. 22, 2008, at C1, C6.
161. See also Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 55, at 274–75 (discussing how the
indeterminacy of intellectual property rights makes enforcement complicated).
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Whatever social benefit may result from permitting a company to
price discriminate must be considered and weighed against the
deterrent or stifling effect that a non-commercial use/personal use
only restriction has upon the software user.162 If one of the reasons
we permit price discrimination is that we wish to encourage business
innovation and entrepreneurialism, then we must also consider that
there is a business interest that is also implicated—and frustrated—
where we prohibit software from being used for business purposes
for reasons unrelated to software capacity or functionality.163
Perhaps we should also consider what social utility exists in
permitting a software producer to price the same product differently
for different customers without having to justify or earn that
increased price. The goal of economic efficiency provides a
justification for permitting price discrimination; yet it does not
explain why price discrimination is facilitated in this manner for
software but not for other types of businesses. We do not charge
wealthy people more for goods simply because they are willing to pay
more. A car buyer is not given a purchase price based upon whether
he or she will use the vehicle for business, personal, or mixed
business and personal journeys. Enforcing a non-commercial
use/personal use only restriction is particularly anomalous given that
it may be much easier and more practical to provide a commercial
version of software by providing enhanced functionality or additional
support hours.
It is important to realize that a refusal to enforce “noncommercial use/personal use only” licenses does not render all
commercial uses of software permissible. Certain “commercial” uses
of software will still violate the Copyright Act. These uses include
software leasing and rental of the software, and productizing or
incorporating software into a new product.164 The fact that there are

162. See also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Entrepreneurial Copyright Fair Use: Let the
Independent Contractor Stand in the Shoes of the User, 57 ARK. L. REV. 539 (2005) (discussing
some of the difficulties that small businesses and consumers may face when they attempt to
fully exercise their rights to use software by hiring independent contractors).
163. But see Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 17–19 (1969) (arguing that more monopolistic industries provide the greatest
encouragement to invention).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a) (2000) (“[U]nless authorized by the owners of copyright
in the sound recording or the owner of copyright in a computer program (including any tape,
disk, or other medium embodying such program), and in the case of a sound recording in the
musical works embodied therein, neither the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person
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illegal commercial uses of software does not justify enforcing
overbroad provisions that restrict otherwise legal uses. Finally, it is
worth noting that both parties to a sales transaction are obligated
under the UCC to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.165 A party who uses
software for commercial purposes in a way that constitutes unfair
competition then might be found to have breached its obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.
V. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, I address additional anticipated objections to my
proposed approach and the usual arguments in favor of permitting
software transactions to be classified as “licensing transactions”
rather than “sales transactions” even where reality indicates
otherwise. I conclude that my approach exposes the license-sale
opposition as a false dichotomy which in turn falsely constructs the
software licensing dilemma. While the manipulability of software as a
product is unique, the issues a licensing strategy seeks to resolve are
not. While there may in fact be issues particular to software
producers, the dilemma that they now face is one that is common to
manufacturers of other products in other industries.166

in possession of a particular copy of a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other
medium embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial
advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that phonorecord or
computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying such program) by
rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending.”).
165. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001). While both the amended and pre-amended version of
Article 1 impose a duty of good faith in the performance of contracts, the two versions define
good faith differently. See Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, but Not Yet Duplicated,
Revised
Uniform
Commercial
Code
Article
1,
(Mar.
6,
2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968869. As Rowley notes, while both
versions require subjective honesty, the revised Article 1 would require reasonable commercial
standards from both merchants and non-merchants alike. Id. at 4. While it may be an open
issue whether software constitutes “goods” for purposes of the UCC, courts will likely look to
the Code for guidance, even if it is not binding upon the transaction.
166. Keith Rowley notes that “[m]ost state courts recognize an implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing in all contracts.” See Rowley, supra note 165, at 19.
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A. Software Manipulability Necessitates Greater Control (i.e., The
First “Software is Different” Argument)
Some may argue that software producers need to contractually
protect their products because of software manipulability.167 Yet,
many copyrighted products such as books, movies, and music are
easy to copy.168 Paintings and architecture are also capable of being
copied more easily now than in the past due to technological
improvements, including improved digitization capabilities. There
may have been a need for contractual protection when it was
uncertain that intellectual property law protected software.169 As
previously noted, a software sale is not a transfer of ownership to the
underlying code or the program.170 Software is still subject to
copyright protection.171 The written documents—the shrinkwrap and
clickwrap “agreements”—served a useful purpose at a time when the

167. See O’Rourke, supra note 125, at 486–87 (“[The] public goods problem addressed
by copyright law is particularly acute in the case of software. Millions of dollars may be invested
in software design and coding. However, once the software is distributed on disk or made
electronically accessible, it is easily copied and distributed to others.”).
168. See Nadan, supra note 153, at 557–59 (“This article argues that software is different,
but not for the traditional (and flawed) rationale that software is easy to copy. Rather, software
is different because of the two considerations observed above—the same copy can be
significantly more valuable to a commercial user (the personal and commercial versions are
often identical—only the license that comes with the software would be different), with
potentially enormous liability for its malfunction. These considerations are fairly unique to
software.”).
169. Database protection is largely still unavailable under copyright law. Feist Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361–62 (1991) (holding that in order to receive
copyright protection, a database needs to demonstrate sufficient originality in the selection or
arrangement of its contents); see also Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of Copyright Protection
for Electronic Databases Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Are Shrinkwrap Licenses a Viable
Alternative for Database Protection?, 31 IND. L. REV. 143 (1998); see also Lipton, Mixed
Metaphors, supra note 50. While the code used to compile the database information may be
protected by copyright, the information likely would not be. Consequently, a provider of
database information would likely choose to enter into a licensing—as opposed to a sales—
transaction. In addition, a software provider would be wise to incorporate some type of
encryption measure to minimize the likelihood of unauthorized access.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied.”).
171. Determann & Fellmeth, supra note 20. For a discussion of the potential problems
related to copyright protection to computer programs, see generally Litman, supra note 35.
But see Smith & Mann, supra note 91 (arguing that intellectual property laws have had an
“important impact” on the success of the software industry but that copyright may not be
enough to adequately protect against certain forms of copying in the near future).
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parameters of software use were unclear.172 The parameters are better
defined now.173 In May 1964, the Copyright Office agreed to
register copyrights on computer programs.174 In fact, some
commentators believe that software copyrights are too easily
obtained, thus chilling innovations in software development.175 The
1998 Digital Millennium Circumvention Act (“DMCA”) further
enhances the ability of software producers to take electronic
measures to protect their works.176
If a patent has been filed for the code, patent law also protects
the corresponding program, making any unauthorized uses subject
to an infringement suit.177 Some commentators have suggested that
patent law provides a better regime for governing software than
either copyright or trade secret law.178 Software may be even more
protectable than other products since the passage of the DMCA.
One of the goals of the DMCA was to reassure copyright owners
that making their works available on the Internet would not subject
them to massive piracy.179 Congress believed that it could encourage

172. See O’Rourke, supra note 125, at 488 (noting that “in the earliest days of software
distribution, it simply was not clear that software was protected by copyright law” and as a
result, software producers felt a need to obtain such protection contractually).
173. But see id. at 489–99 (stating that while the availability of copyright protection for
software is more certain, software is still more vulnerable to abuse than hard copy works). This
author believes that the ease with which hard copy works can be converted to digital format
and widely distributed makes this argument—while perhaps true ten years ago—much less
forceful today. For example, this year there was the unauthorized digital “release” of the much
anticipated “hard copy” seventh installment of the Harry Potter series.
174. See generally Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1274 (1964).
175. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 81–86 (2001); Jacqueline D. Lipton,
IP’s Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigm for Software Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205
(2006).
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V. 1999).
177. See Smith & Mann, supra note 91, at 242 (suggesting that “patent protection may
emerge as a critical form of IP protection for software” in the next few years).
178. See id. at 256; see also Menell, supra note 75, at 1364–65; Nadan, supra note 153, at
555. Some commentators believe that patent protection for software, like copyright protection,
stifles innovation. See Julie A. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001); Eloise Gratton, Should Patent Protection Be
Considered for Computer Software-Related Innovations?, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 223
(2003).
179. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control
over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2001) (“While
copyright owners could distribute their works encased in some form of technological
protection, they still perceived a probability that others would remove those protections,
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digital communication only by reinforcing the control that copyright
holders had over distribution of their works, despite the loss to the
public of circumvention devices.180 In other words, while software
producers may need to control use of their products, they do not
need to do so more than do producers of other types of products.
Much of this analysis is also applicable to other consumer
products containing digital information, such as music CDs and
movie DVDs, which are also readily distributable.181 But in addition
to being susceptible to unauthorized distribution, the manipulable
quality of software makes it much more difficult to discover
infringing uses in competitive products. For example, while it may be
difficult for a music producer to discover all the infringers who are
distributing its music without permission, a product, such as a song,
which incorporates the music or any portion thereof, is easily
detectable. In most cases, a software producer would have a much
more difficult time proving that its software was incorporated into a
competitive product.182
As a practical matter, however, the existence of a contract will
likely not dissuade users who knowingly infringe copyrights.
Enforcing a license as an “agreement” between the parties is no
more likely to deter infringers than would notifying them of the
difference between legitimate and infringing activity.

making the work as vulnerable to unlicensed copying as it would have been without resort to
technological measures.”).
180. See Ginsburg, supra note 179, at 1613. In fact, Glynn Lunney argues that “the
DMCA goes too far in its efforts to eliminate the threat digital technology poses.” Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 819 (2001). He further argues that “[b]y
prohibiting others from possessing the decryption tools necessary to break the technological
locks that the copyright industry places on its digital works, the DMCA empowers those who
produce digital works of authorship to set the terms of public access.” Id.
181. David Rice notes that one of the objectives of software license agreements is to
achieve market protection by prohibiting rental of software. The rental prohibition aims to
eliminate the opportunity for third parties to rent software at a fraction of its retail price and
then make an unauthorized copy of the software at little additional cost. See Rice, supra note
15, at 158. Rental of software is now prohibited under 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a) (2000). The
problem of illicit copying is one that the movie industry has faced since the inception of video
rentals and is not unique to the software industry.
182. Difficult, but not impossible. One way that software companies thwart infringers is
by embedding pieces of useless code into a program. If such code shows up in another
program, infringement is likely to be found. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY,
THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW 486 (2008).
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In addition to the protections available under the law, software
producers may also protect their product through its architecture or
by installing lock-up or other protective devices.183
B. Software Is Inherently Faulty, Which Necessitates Substantial
Control over Distribution (i.e., The Second “Software Is Different”
Argument)
Another oft-cited justification for software license agreements is
that it is nearly impossible to produce bug-free software.184 The
argument is usually employed to justify contractual restrictions on
commercial use of software since, the argument goes, if a product is
used in a business, the potential for loss of profit and other
consequential damages in the event of software failure is so
substantial that it would cripple the software industry. According to
this argument, software license agreements are necessary even in
mass-market, consumer transactions in order to encourage
innovation in the software industry and to facilitate the introduction
of new products into the marketplace that would otherwise be
delayed or deterred by liability concerns.
The concerns over the liability of software producers for
consequential damages are greatly exaggerated. Both the UCC and
the Magnuson Moss Act permit sellers to limit their liability for lost
profits and other consequential damages. Although sellers may be
constrained in their ability to completely disclaim implied

183. Lipton, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 50, at 251 (“Technological encryption
measures are often utilized to prevent unauthorized access, and contractual licensing and
transfer schemes are used for commercial transactions involving such databases.”); see also Brett
Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A
Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000)
(discussing legal and extralegal protections of software). Frischmann and Moylan note that
“today’s landscape affords software producers unprecedented protection over their products”
that may ultimately hurt innovation. Id. at 915. Of course, such software protections are
susceptible to hackers, but in this way, such protective measures are no different from antiburglary measures taken by a homeowner who continues to be susceptible to break-in. As
Lawrence Lessig famously noted, “Code is law,” meaning that code regulates cyberspace, but
law in cyberspace as in the physical world, is not failsafe. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); see also James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by
Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719 (observing that while regulation by software is attractive in some
areas, it is dangerous in others).
184. Nadan, supra note 153; Rice, supra note 15, at 178 (acknowledging that in the
commercial market context, “controlling liability exposure may have strong efficacy and
efficiency justification in some circumstances”).
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warranties,185 they may limit the available remedy, thereby limiting
their risk exposure.
In light of the software producer’s ability to limit its liability for
consequential damages, there is no good reason to permit software
producers to exempt themselves from all the warranties implied
under state law. Software producers should be required to deliver a
product that meets certain minimal standards of merchantability, and
a failure to do so should entitle consumers to receive refunds. This
should not enable consumers to copy software and then falsely claim
that it does not work. A software producer may implement return
policies, such as allowing product testing, to deter false claims. By
the same token, software producers should not receive payments for
products that do not work.
There is another important reason why we should not permit
software producers to “contract” out of state implied warranties. If
courts were to view mass-market software transactions as “licensing
transactions” and thus exempt from the regulatory systems that
govern sales transactions, they would put retailers in an untenable
position. Any license agreement governs only the relationship
between the licensor and the end user; there is typically no such
agreement between the retailer and the consumer. Mass-market
consumer license agreements do not usually include any reference to
retailers or other third-party distributors. Under ordinary rules of
offer and acceptance, the retailer has sold a product to the consumer
that makes the retailer subject to liability for warranties implied
under state law. If the terms of the written document contained
within a software product package are deemed to be “contract
terms” that govern the relationship between the software producer
and the end user, then incongruously the retailer is liable for state
implied warranties for having “sold” the product (when it should
have sublicensed it), whereas the software producer is not liable.

185. The UCC permits warranty disclaimers provided that they conform to certain
requirements under U.C.C. § 2-316(2). The Magnuson-Moss Act does not permit disclaimers
of implied warranties if the product is accompanied by a written warranty although the Act
does not require the issuance of any warranty at all. However, the Magnuson-Moss Act does
permit limitations of liability.
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C. Software Producers Should Be Able to Distribute Their Products as
They See Fit (i.e., The Libertarian View of Property)
Some may contend that software producers should be permitted
to decide how they wish to release their products to the public.
Certainly software producers have the prerogative to decide whether
to license rather than to sell their software products. But such
freedom does not entitle software producers to reshape reality. In
other words, nothing in my proposal prohibits software producers
from entering into pure licensing, rather than sales transactions,186
nor am I arguing against the enforceability of form contracts in
general. Software producers, however, should not be able to
characterize a transaction in ways that violate generally accepted
principles of contract law. Until ProCD and its progeny, a sales
transaction was considered concluded when the purchaser paid the
purchase price and the retailer transferred possession of the product.
Software producers, of course, are free to enter into pure licensing
transactions, or to negotiate or impose contractual terms—provided
that they do so prior to the conclusion of the sales transaction.
Some may argue that transaction costs are too high for software
producers to realistically consider individual negotiations of software
license agreements, which is one of the factors involved in
determining whether a transaction is a license or a sale. While there is
undoubtedly a transaction cost issue, it is unclear how much of an
obstacle it truly is, given the existence of form contracts in other
consumer transactions. The transaction cost issue is not one that is
unique to the software industry. Transaction cost issues arise in all
mass-market consumer transactions where the seller or manufacturer
wishes to somehow “condition” the sale or use of the product being
sold. In fact, that is the cost that the seller, manufacturer, or lessor
should incur to obtain terms that might otherwise be unavailable
under the default rules (such as the UCC) governing the transaction.
If software producers wish to limit the duration and use of their
software products, then they should engage in a true licensing
transaction instead of a transaction that has all the characteristics of a
sale save for a written “contract” contained within the software

186. Other commentators, however, have expressed concern about permitting a software
producer to contractually eliminate the right of first sale. See, e.g., Determann & Fellmeth,
supra note 20; Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 61; Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra
note 61.
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package (and accessible only after the end user has taken possession
of the product). A true licensing transaction—while increasing the
transaction costs for the software producer—heightens the end user’s
awareness that the software product that he or she is paying for may
not meet his or her expectations.187 Contract law posits that, as a
general matter, courts will not review the adequacy of consideration;
much of this laissez faire attitude is justified on the grounds that the
parties have actively bargained for their rights and obligations. Where
a basic assumption of contract law—and the doctrinal rules that flow
from that assumption—is negotiated terms, it is misguided to say
that high transaction costs justify enforcing transactions as contracts
without any negotiations.188 Furthermore, as Part III.C explains, the
failure of written terms (whether electronic or printed) to constitute
a contract does not mean that none of the terms contained in that
written document are enforceable. The software purchaser’s assent
may be presumed with respect to the rights granted, and the
derivative restrictions contained, in that document. Recognizing the
license grant terms as enforceable, independent from the validity of
the written terms as a contract, eliminates much of the justification
for non-negotiated license agreements.
D. Software Producers Need to Control Subsequent Sales in Order to
Sell More Copies of Software
Another objection to characterizing software transactions as
“sales” rather than “licenses” is that, in doing so, the end user
becomes an owner of a copy of the software product, thus
implicating the first sale and associated rights under the Copyright
Act.189 If a consumer is able to purchase used copies of legitimately

187. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace: Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1155 (1998) (expressing skepticism about the desirability of regulating
information access through contracts); Fisher, supra note 129, at 1246 (noting that contracts
on the Internet “go far toward eliminating the presumption of social desirability usually
accorded voluntary bargains” because of the informational asymmetries and the lack of
bargaining power characteristic of such contracts).
188. But cf. Reichman & Franklin, supra note 82, at 954–59 (proposing non-negotiable
terms that are even-handed and socially responsible).
189. Christopher B. Yeh, WallData Inc., v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t: License
Versus Sale at the Crossroad of Contract and Copyright, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 355, 362
(“The key rationale, however, for supporting a licensing regime is concern for preservation of
the software industry’s business model. The first sale doctrine is the bane of the business model
because it prevents software developers from controlling subsequent transfer of their product,
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acquired software products at a reduced price, this creates a lost
revenue opportunity for the software producer.190 While this
observation may be true, it does not express a truth that is confined
to the software industry.191 Especially with the ready availability of
the Internet as a marketplace and distribution channel, the issue of
product resales plagues many industries and products. The challenge
that consumer goods manufacturers face arises from the creation of a
secondary market in goods that is much more accessible due to the
low barriers to entry for Internet resellers, the ease of comparison
shopping on the Web, and the existence of sites like eBay and
Amazon. But if one of the underlying goals of contract law is
promoting economic efficiency, that goal is furthered by the Internet
and sites like eBay and Amazon, which bring buyers and sellers
together and reduce transaction costs and the need for
intermediaries. If the Internet causes some businesses to rethink their
business
model,
then
it
encourages
innovation
and
entrepreneurialism.192 In this respect, however, software is not
different from other products—and the dilemma faced by the
software industry is not unique.

which in turn prevents them from generating revenue from it.”); see also Nadan, supra note
153, at 268–84.
190. For a discussion of how digital dissemination may actually diminish the impact of
the first sale doctrine see Reese, supra note 156, at 579. Reese speculates that as e-commerce
and encryption technology grows, the “first sale doctrine may remain on the books . . . but if
few or no copies of copyrighted works exist, then the doctrine will essentially be a dead letter.”
Id.
191. See also Madison, supra note 50, at 299–300 (stating that treating a software
transaction as a license rather than a sale “effectively treats section 109, the codification of
copyright’s venerable first sale doctrine, as a nullity in the context of computer programs . . . .
‘Copies’ of computer programs might be ‘licensed’ and therefore excluded from section 109 . .
. but there is no evidence in the statute or in the logic and history of copyright law that
supports permitting owners of copyrights in computer programs to have the power to ‘license’
copies in ways that publishers of books and phonorecords cannot”).
192. For example, software producers might bypass the first sale doctrine altogether by
distributing software digitally or through technological protection measures. See Reese, supra
note 156. R. Anthony Reese notes that new digital markets have already developed in existing
industries:
Websites for newspapers such as The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times sell
access to individual articles. Encyclopedia Britannica offers the full content of its
encyclopedia online for an annual or monthly subscription fee, offering a new
alternative to previous choices. . . . Additionally, the major recording labels have
launched . . . online music services . . . that give users the ability to listen to a
limited music catalog on demand for a monthly fee.
Id. at 619.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The dilemma faced by the software industry is not whether
software is or should be licensed or sold but how software producers
can adapt their business model to an environment where distribution
is cheap and transactions are efficient.193 Paradoxically, technology
that threatens an existing business or industry may provide
unexpected revenue streams for that business or industry. For
example, streaming music on the Internet has been blamed for the
decrease in the number of CDs sold; however, technological
developments have created new uses for music in other forms. The
ubiquity of recorded music on electronic and wireless devices opens
new opportunities for music companies and related businesses that
are savvy enough to recognize the opportunity.194 The issues that the
software industry must address are common to those faced by other
industries, including the music industry. Not surprisingly, the way
the software industry resolves these challenges has implications that
reverberate beyond that particular market segment.195 The policy
considerations—economic efficiency and business innovation—used
to justify special treatment for software producers also militate
against such treatment, as software license agreements often
discourage both.196
The “contractualization” of software transactions has set a
dangerous precedent for other commercial goods as sales of non-

193. See Kim, Internet Challenges to Business Innovation, supra note 159 (discussing ways
that companies might re-think their businesses to adjust to changes in the digital
environment).
194. See Jay Reeves, Company Gets Rich on College Fight Songs, Associated Press, Feb. 23,
2008 (discussing “a major trend in the music industry, where publishing companies are reaping
the benefits of the digital music that’s become the soundtrack to life thanks to microprocessors
and streaming sound”).
195. Some courts, however, may be reluctant to accept the use of a licensing strategy
with non-software products. In a recent case, for example, a federal district court held that a
promotional music CD was a gift or a sold product, despite being labeled with language
stating that it was being licensed for personal use only. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Troy
Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
196. See also Lemley & Weiser, supra note 58, at 783–84 (“Over the last several decades
. . . more and more courts and commentators have sought to align the rights of IP holders
with those of real property owners, arguing for pervasive use of property rules and limited uses
of ‘liability rules’ (which allow access at a price set by a court or agency). Whether this trend is
managed sensibly will greatly influence how innovation develops and whether the Internet will
remain as a platform for innovation and economic growth.”).
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software products are increasingly conditioned upon certain terms.197
The restrictions on the use of products stifle entrepreneurialism and
innovation.198 The prohibition on subsequent transfers hinders
economic efficiency by keeping second-generation buyers and sellers
apart. If other industries were to adopt the contract model adopted
by the software industry the results may even be environmentally
wasteful because they would prevent original owners from reselling
products that they no longer wanted and would force potential
buyers to purchase new products.199 The manufacturers of goods
would benefit from increased production of products but the class of
purchasers would not. The re-use and recycling of products that have
lost utility for their original owners, but that retain commercial
value, should be encouraged. While the material waste associated
with producing software and other digital products may be minimal
compared to other products, the rationale used to support software
licensing may be used to support licensing of other types of
products.
The business issues faced by the software industry as a result of
technological advancements are not different from those faced by
other industries and neither is the “solution” that the software
industry has adopted. While an outright prohibition or ban on sales
contracts is not desirable or socially beneficial, neither is the
reconfiguration of reality by software producers and other goods
manufacturers. The software industry faces a dilemma, but it is not

197. See Winston, supra note 119, at 93 (“[T]he use of private legislation to circumvent
and frustrate public legislation has expanded, due to the success of software licenses, and now
owners of many types of intellectual property are relying on private legislation, rather than
public legislation, to regulate users’ rights in their chattels”). While there may be an increase in
licensing, contractual restrictions on the sale of goods have existed prior to the advent of mass
consumer software and personal computers. See generally Raymond Nimmer, Issues in
Licensing: An Introduction, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 941, 947 (2005) (“Although licenses have been
widely used in the commercial marketplace for generations, express licenses became widespread
in mass markets only within the past quarter century”); Robinson, supra note 18.
198. See also Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 55, at 258 (arguing that “spillovers”—the
uncompensated benefits that one person’s activity provides to others—encourage greater
innovation).
199. See, e.g., Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 421 F.3d
981 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a printer cartridge notice restricting reuse of printer
cartridges in return for a discount at purchase was enforceable). Ironically, Lexmark asserted
that one of the reasons for its “prebate” policy was an effort to be environmentally conscious.
Id. at 984. This author is skeptical of the sincerity of this environmental commitment as the
post-sale restriction did not require consumers to return cartridges at all but only precluded
them from returning them to another remanufacturer. Id. at 984 n.2.
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one that presents itself because of the unique nature of software. It is
a dilemma created by technology and one that should be resolved by
innovative business strategies rather than novel—and questionable—
legal tactics.
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